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Abstract
We revisit the Tragedy of the Commons in an dynamic overlapping
generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheep
they let graze on a common parcel of land, while relying on different
forms of rationality (Nash players, Pure or Impure Kantian players). We
examine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the
prevalance of those different forms of rationality evolves over time follow-
ing a vertical/oblique socialization process a` la Bisin and Verdier (2001).
We study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land,
and we show that introducing a quota may, in some cases, reduce the
proportion of Kantians (Pure and Impure), and worsen the Tragedy of
Commons with respect to the laissez-faire. Finally, we examine whether
a government should promote either a Pure or an Impure Kantian moral-
ity, by comparing the relative fitness of Pure/Impure Kantians, and their
interactions with the congestion of land.
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1 Introduction
Popularized by Harding (1968), the Tragedy of the Commons refers to a general
class of situations where a common resource is overused by individuals who
do not, when making their decisions, internalize the negative impact of their
decisions on others’ interests. The standard example of the Tragedy of the
Commons consists of an economy of shepherds whose sheep graze on the same
common (unregulated) parcel of land. When deciding how many sheep they
let graze, each shepherd may not fully internalize the negative effect of raising
the number of sheep on the output (wool, meat) of other shepherds. As a
consequence, the land is congestionned, the return per sheep is low, and there
is an aggregate undersupply of output.
Referring to the game-theoretical literature on Prisoners’ Dilemmas, the
Tragedy of the Commons can be described as a Nash equilibrium that is not
Pareto efficient. To turn back to the example of shepherds, the land congestion
that prevails at the laissez-faire is not Pareto efficient: each shepherd would be
strictly better off than at the laissez-faire provided there was a way to enforce
a global reduction in the number of sheep per shepherd.1
The overuse of a common resource has been widely tested in experiments
through common pool resource games.2 In those games, a common, unregulated
resource can be extracted by some players at the detriment of others. The the-
oretical prediction of those games is that each player plays Nash, and extracts
a lot. However, although outcomes of common pool resource games vary de-
pending on the particular rules of the game, experimental evidence shows that a
significant proportion of players extract less than what Nash players maximizing
their own pay-offs would extract.3
A possible explanation for that paradoxical result may be that players play
Nash, but exhibit inequality aversion, as suggested in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
When players are averse to inequality, they choose to behave in a more coop-
erative way, to avoid large inequalities in outcomes among players. Another
possible explanation is that the concept of Nash equilibrium is not adequate to
describe how individuals behave in those experiments. Rabin (1993) developed
the concept of fairness equilibrium, i.e. a set of strategies and beliefs on other
player’s intentions such that (i) each player plays the best reply to the other
players strategies given his beliefs on other players’ intentions; (ii) those be-
liefs are actually verified. Alternatively, Roemer (2010) introduced the concept
of Kantian equilibrium. Kantian rationality consists in choosing not the best
strategy for oneself, but the best generalizable strategy, i.e. the best strategy in
the hypothetical case where a group (possibly everyone) would play it as well.
1Indeed, such a reduction would, by raising the return per sheep, raise the net output per
shepherd, and, as such, this would constitute a Pareto improvement.
2See Walker and Gardner (1992), Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994), Keser and Gardner
(1999), Ostrom et al (2002) and Apesteguia (2006).
3According to Ostrom et al (2002), players in a basic common pool resource game extract
only about 50 % of the common resource, whereas the unique Nash equilibrium would consist
in extracting 100 % of the common resource.
2
The coexistence of alternative forms of rationality raises the question of the
dynamics of heterogeneity: which form of rationality will survive in the long
run? More specifically, when considering the Tragedy of the Commons, one
may wonder to what extent Kantian players survive or become extinct in the
long-run. Then, turning to an economy with a government, one may also wonder
to what extent public intervention can influence the dynamics of heterogeneity,
by favoring the survival or the extinction of some form of rationality.
The goal of this paper is to study, in a dynamic model, the survival or the
extinction of Kantian behaviors in the context of the Tragedy of the Commons.
For that purpose, we develop a two-period overlapping generations model (OLG)
composed of a population of shepherds, who decide how many sheep they let
graze on a common parcel of land, while relying on different forms of rationality
(Nash players, Pure or Impure Kantian players, the latter being defined as
players choosing the best actions generalized to their group only). In line with
the literature, the more sheep a shepherd has, and the lower is the available
land for each sheep, which reduces the output per sheep.
In order to study the dynamics of heterogeneity in the context of the Tragedy
of the Commons, we rely on a vertical/oblique socialization process a` la Bisin
and Verdier (2001). In that setting, parents, who are motivated by imperfect
empathy towards their children, can, through costly socialization efforts, influ-
ence the probability to transmit their trait (here their kind of rationality, Nash
or Kantian) to their children. The dynamics of heterogeneity thus depends on
parental socialization efforts, which are themselves, because of imperfect empa-
thy, functions of the numbers and distributions of sheep among the population.
Our reliance on a socialization model can be motivated as follows. The liter-
ature on the management of common pool resources emphasized the existence
of strong interactions between, on the one hand, the maintenance of commonly
owned resources, and, on the other hand, the enhancement of a community:
while the composition of a community can affect the overuse of a common re-
source, the reciprocal is also true.4 Obviously this kind of interaction can be
rationalized in various ways, including social learning (Gale et al 1993, Bjorner-
stedt and Weibull 1994). However, the central role of culture in explaining
social behaviors motivates the study of models of cultural transmission. Recent
empirical evidence emphasized that cultural norms are a key determinant of
differences in social behaviors. Focusing on 15 small-scale societies (in Africa,
Asia and South America), Henrich et al (2001) show that there exist significant
differences across tribes in the outcomes of the ultimatum game.5 Moreover,
there is also some evidence of the role of socialization efforts in the transmission
of (non)cooperative behaviors (Knight et al, 1993).
Anticipating our results, we first characterize, at the temporary equilibrium,
4For example, Ostrom (1987) in McCay and Acheson (1987), taking the case of commu-
nal tenure in Swiss Alpins, explained that in those rural communities using common land,
overgrazing has been kept within control, and that not only has the common resource been
protected, but that the community has been enhanced by the absence of overgrazing.
5For instance, the mean offer made by the Mapuche (Chile) is larger than the one made
by the Machiguenga (Peru) (0.34 against 0.26).
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four distinct situations: (1) the symmetric Nash equilibrium (when the popula-
tion is composed of Nash players only); (2) the symmetric Kantian equilibrium
(when the population is composed of Kantian players only); (3) the symmetric
q equilibrium with Pure Kantians (when a fraction q of the population is Pure
Kantian, and chooses the best generalizable strategy independently from the
composition of the population, while a fraction 1− q plays Nash); (4) the sym-
metric q equilibrium with Impure Kantians (when a fraction q of the population
is Impure Kantian, and chooses the best strategy generalizable to its group,
while a fraction 1− q plays Nash). We examine the existence and uniqueness of
those different types of temporary equilibria. Then, when studying the dynam-
ics of heterogeneity, we examine the conditions for the existence, the uniqueness
and the stability of stationary equilibria involving Nash players and (Pure or
Impure) Kantian players. We show that (Pure or Impure) Kantians survive in
the long-run for any initial partition of the population.
When turning to policy, we first show that introducing a quota on the number
of sheep per shepherd may, in some cases, reduce the proportion of Kantians
(Pure and Impure), and worsen the Tragedy of the Commons, by reinforcing
the congestion of land. We also compare, on the basis of numerical analyses,
the impact of a quota with the impact of a Pigouvian tax on animals, and
we show that, although a weak quota can worsen the Tragedy, even a low tax
can help reducing congestion. Thus, in a third-best world with strong political
constraints, the tax perfoms better than the quota. Finally, we examine whether
a government should promote either a Pure or an Impure Kantian morality, by
comparing the relative fitness of Nash players, Pure and Impure Kantian players.
We show that, for a given partition q, the total number of animals is lower at
the q equilibrium with Pure Kantians than at the q equilibrium with Impure
Kantians. However, once allowing for the endogeneity of the partition, whether
a Pure or an Impure Kantian morality yields a less severe Tragedy varies with
the parametrizations, and with the extent of the congestion of land.
Our paper is related to the literature on the dynamics of heterogeneity, and
its applications to common resource games. First, our study is especially related
to the article by Curry and Roemer (2012), which focuses on the Tragedy of
the Commons in the case of a shepherds’ economy, and studies the dynamics of
heterogeneity (Nash versus Kantian players) by means of an evolutionary game
approach. Curry and Roemer show that Kantian behavior can be evolutionary
advantageous when Kantian players can observe the type of their opponents,
which raises the question of the signaling of types. Our paper complements
Curry and Roemer (2012) by considering the survival of Kantian behaviors by
means of a socialization approach involving parental efforts. Our paper is also
close to Sethi and Somanathan (1996) who study the evolution of social norms
in common property resource use by means of an evolutionary game approach.
Unlike us, they consider the possibility of punishing defectors. We complement
that paper by modeling how parents, by socialization efforts, contribute to the
production of behavioral norms in the population. Another related paper, but
in the context of climate change, is Van Long (2015), who characterizes the Kan-
tian equilibrium in a dynamic game of climate change mitigations, and studies
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the dynamics of the partition of Kantians in the population. Second, our pa-
per is also related to the literature on evolutionary dynamics focusing on the
survival of cooperative behaviors (Weibull 1995, Sethi and Somanathan 2001,
Cressman 2003). Using a general model of evolutionary dynamics, Alger and
Weibull (2014) show that Kantian morality can, unlike selfishness, be evolution-
ary stable. That general result applies to various environments, including the
Tragedy of the Commons. Third, our paper complements also the literature
on the economics of culture and socialization (Bisin and Verdier 2001, 2011).
While that literature focused mainly on the transmission of preferences traits,
we focus here on the transmission of different forms of rationality. Finally, on
the policy side, our paper is also related to the public economics literature show-
ing that public policy can sometimes have perverse effects, through its impact
on motivations (Brekke et al, 2003; Ponthiere 2013).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and char-
acterizes the static Nash equilibrium, Kantian equilibrium, q equilibrium with
Pure Kantians and q equilibrium with Impure Kantians. Section 3 studies social-
ization and the long-run dynamics of heterogeneity. The impact of introducing
a quota on sheep per shepherd on the dynamics of heterogeneity and on con-
gestion is examined in Section 4. Section 5 studies the influence of a Pigouvian
tax on congestion. The relative fitness of the Pure and Impure Kantians (with
respect to Nash players) is examined in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a 2-period OLG economy with a fixed piece of land of finite surface.
Each cohort is a continuum of agents of size 1. Individuals live two periods.
Period 1 is childhood, during which no decision is made. Period 2 is adulthood,
during which individuals produce some output (e.g. meat or wool) by means of
land and some input (e.g. sheep).
The population is composed of two types of agents i ∈ {K,N}, who differ
regarding the decision rule they follow for the choice of level of input:
• Kantian agents (denoted type-K): those agents, when choosing the amount
of input, choose the best generalizable input level;
• Nash agents (denoted type-N): those agents, when choosing the amount
of input, choose the best input level for himself, conditionally on some
beliefs regarding the choice of inputs of others.
At time t, the proportion of Kantian agents in the population of young adults
is equal to qt, whereas the proportion of Nash agents is equal to 1− qt.
2.1 Production
Each individual i produces an output yit by means of some input (animals)
eit and land. Land is publicly owned: no producer has any property right on
5
it. The amount of land used by each producer/shepherd is supposed to be
strictly proportional to the relative number of animals used by the producer, in
proportion to the total number of animals used in the population.
The production function for each producer i is:
yit = F
(
eit, s
i
t
)
(1)
where sit ≡ e
i
tS
Et
is the amount of land used by the producer i, while Et ≡∫ 1
i=0
eitdi. Since there is no property right on land, the amount of land used by
producer i is strictly proportional to the share of the number of animals he uses
within the total number of animals.
Substituting for sit, we have:
yit = F
(
eit,
eit
Et
S
)
(2)
Let us normalize S to 1. Let us assume that F (·) is homogenous of degree
1. Dividing the LHS and the RHS by eit, we obtain:
yit
eit
= F
(
1,
1
Et
)
(3)
which the product per producer per animal. Hence the total product per shep-
herd is:
yit = e
i
tF
(
1,
1
Et
)
(4)
Defining G (Et) ≡ EtF
(
1, 1Et
)
as the society’s product, we get:
yit =
eit
Et
G (Et) (5)
which is the functional form used by Curry and Roemer (2012). Note that we
have G′ (Et) > 0 and G′′ (Et) < 0.
2.2 Preferences
Individuals derive utility from consumption, as well as some disutility from
training animals.
Consumption is defined as the difference between the sales and the cost of
buying animals:
xit = p
eit
Et
G (Et)− ceit (6)
where p is the price of output and c is the unit cost of animals. In the rest of
this paper, we normalize p to 1 without loss of generality.
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Individual utility on consumption u
(
xit
)
is:
u
(
xit
)
=
(
xit
)1−σ
1− σ (7)
with 0 < σ < 1.
Total utility is defined as:
U(eit) ≡
(
eit
Et
G (Et)− ceit
)1−σ
1− σ − v
(
eit
)
(8)
where v
(
eit
)
is the disutility of training animals. We assume, for the sake of
simplicity, that this disutility takes the following form:
v
(
eit
)
=
ψ
(
eit
)2
2
(9)
We have: v′
(
eit
)
= ψeit and v
′′ (eit) = ψ.
2.3 Decision rule
The two types of agents differ regarding the way in which they choose the
number of animals.
2.3.1 Nash behavior
Type N agents solve the standard maximization of utility problem, subject to
market prices and to beliefs regarding the choice of animals by other producers
eˆit. This problem can be written as:
max
eNt
(
eNt
Eˆt
G
(
Eˆt
)
− ceNt
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eNt
)2
2
s.t. Eˆt ≡
∫ 1
i=0
eˆitdi
Note that the marginal impact of eNt on Eˆt equals 0, due to the fact that
there is a continuum of agents. Hence the optimal eNt satisfies:(
G(Eˆt)
Eˆt
− c
)
(
eNt
Eˆt
G
(
Eˆt
)
− ceNt
)σ − ψeNt = 0 (10)
Given that u′(xit) > 0, the optimal level of e
N
t satisfies:
eN∗t =
(
G(Eˆt)
Eˆt
− c
)
ψ
(
eN∗t
)σ (G(Eˆt)
Eˆt
− c
)σ (11)
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Hence we have:
(
eN∗t
)1+σ
=
(
G(Eˆt)
Eˆt
− c
)1−σ
ψ
(12)
eN∗t =

(
G(Eˆt)
Eˆt
− c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
(13)
Thus the optimal number of animals eN∗t is decreasing in the expected num-
ber of animals of other producers Eˆ−Nt , since the derivative of
G(Eˆt)
Eˆt
wrt to
Eˆ−Nt is negative. This is a standard reaction function. Thus we have:
deN∗t
dEˆ−Nt
< 0
This depends on the expected levels of animals for all producers, Kantian
and non-Kantian, and on the proportions of the two types in the population qt
and 1− qt.
2.3.2 Pure Kantians
Kantian rationality is about choosing the best ”generalizable” actions. There
exist two distinct types of Kantian behaviors, which differ regarding the scope
of the ”generalizability”: generalizability to the whole society (Pure Kantians)
or to the group of Kantians only (Impure Kantians).
Pure Kantians (sometimes called Kantians with imperfect information) se-
lect the number of animals that leads to the largest generalizable well-being
level, that is, the number of animals such that, if chosen by all individuals
(without exception), this would lead to the largest level of well-being.
Impure Kantian (sometimes called Kantians with perfect information) select
the number of animals that leads to the largest well-being level generalizable to
all Kantians, that is, the number of animals such that, if chosen by all Kantian
individuals (with exception of the N -type agents), this would lead to the largest
level of well-being for Kantian people. Note that, by definition, Impure Kantian
exist only when q < 1. When q = 1, Impure Kantians behave like Pure Kantians.
When Pure Kantians, type-K agents solve the following problem. The look
for the number of animals that maximize their own well-being provided all other
individuals enjoy the same number of animals. The problem can be written as:
max
eKt
(
eKt
Et
G (Et)− ceKt
)1−σ
1− σ − ψ
(
eKt
)2
2
s.t. Et ≡ eKt
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The optimal eK∗t satisfies:(
eK∗t
Et
G (Et)− ceK∗t
)−σ
(G′ (Et)− c) = ψeKt (14)
An interior solution requires G′ (Et)− c > 0.
Hence:
eK∗t =
 (G′ (Et)− c)
ψ
(
G(Et)
Et
− c
)σ
 11+σ (15)
Given that Et = e
K∗
t with Pure Kantians, it follows that the optimal Kantian
number of animals is independent from qt, unlike the one of a Nash player.
Let us compare this with the Nash optimal level of animals:
eN∗t =

(
G(Eˆt)
Eˆt
− c
)
ψ
(
G(Et)
Et
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
Given that G′ (Et) <
G(Eˆt)
Eˆt
, we obviously have:
eK∗t < e
N∗
t (16)
2.3.3 Impure Kantians
When Impure Kantians, type-K agents solve the following problem. They look
for the number of animals that maximize their own well-being provided all
other Kantian individuals enjoy the same number of animals and the 1−q other
individuals play Nash. The problem can be written as:
max
eKt
(
eKt
Et
G (Et)− ceKt
)1−σ
1− σ − ψ
(
eKt
)2
2
s.t. Et ≡ qteKt + (1− qt)eNt
The optimal eK∗∗t satisfies:(
Et−eK∗∗t qt
(Et)
2 G (Et) +
eK∗∗t
Et
G′ (Et) qt − c
)
(
eK∗∗t
Et
G (Et)− ceK∗∗t
)σ = ψeK∗∗t (17)
Hence:
eK∗∗t =

(
Et−eK∗∗t qt
(Et)
2 G (Et) +
eK∗∗t
Et
G′ (Et) qt − c
)
ψ
(
G(Et)
Et
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
(18)
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That condition can be rewritten as:
eK∗∗t =

(
eK∗∗t qt
Et
) [
G′ (Et)− G(Et)Et
]
+ G(Et)Et − c
ψ
(
G(Et)
Et
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
(19)
Note that, when qt = 0, this condition collapses to
(G(Eˆt)Eˆt −c)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
,
which coincides with eNt . When qt = 1, the condition collapses to e
K∗∗
t =[
G′(Et)−c
ψ
(
G(Et)
Et
−c
)σ
] 1
1+σ
= eK∗t .
2.4 Equilibria
Let us consider now the characterization of the equilibria under the different
partitions of the population in terms of Kantian (Pure and Impure) and non-
Kantian. For that purpose, we will first consider the existence of an equilibrium
when the population is composed exclusively of Kantian individuals or Nash
players. Then, in a second stage, we will consider the existence of an equilibrium
in mixed societies.
Throughout this paper, we will focus only on symmetric equilibria, i.e. equi-
libria where each Nash player acts as the other Nash players, and where each
Kantian player acts as the other Kantians.
2.4.1 Kantian equilibrium
Let us first consider an economy that is composed only of Kantian individuals.
Definition 1 A (symmetric) Kantian equilibrium (q = 1) is a distribution of
animal numbers uniform with eit = e
K∗
t such that:
eK∗t =

(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− c)
ψ
(
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
Proposition 1 examines the existence and uniqueness of the Kantian equi-
librium.
Proposition 1 In an economy with q = 1, there exists a (symmetric) Kantian
equilibrium. A sufficient condition for uniqueness of the Kantian equilibrium is:
eK∗t G
′′ (eK∗t )
G′
(
eK∗t
)− G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
> σ ∀0 ≤ eK∗t < G′−1 (c)
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Proof. There exists a (symmetric) Kantian equilibrium if and only if the equa-
tion
eK∗t =

(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− c)
ψ
(
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
admits a solution.
Remind that the interiority of the optimal number of animals requires:
G′
(
eK∗t
) − c > 0. At eK∗t = 0, we know that the RHS of the above equa-
tion is strictly positive. Moreover, at eK∗t = G
′−1 (c), the RHS of the above
condition equals zero. Hence, by continuity, the RHS must necessarily intersect
the 45◦ line at least once.
Regarding uniqueness, note that the derivative of the RHS wrt to eK∗t is:
1
1 + σ

(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− c)
ψ
(
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ−1

(
G′′
(
eK∗t
))
ψ
(
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
− c
)σ
− (G′ (eK∗t )− c)ψσ(G(eK∗t )eK∗t − c
)σ−1
G′(eK∗t )e
K∗
t −G(eK∗t )
(eK∗t )
2

ψ2
(
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
− c
)2σ
Hence we have:
1
1 + σ

(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− c)
ψ
(
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ−1 [
G′′
(
eK∗t
)− (G′(eK∗t )−c)σ
G(eK∗t )−ceK∗t
(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
)]
ψ
(
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
− c
)σ
The sign of this expression is the sign of:
G′′
(
eK∗t
)− (G′ (eK∗t )− c)σ
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t
(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− G (eK∗t )
eK∗t
)
or
G′′
(
eK∗t
)− (G′ (eK∗t )− c)σ
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
− c
1
eK∗t
(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− G (eK∗t )
eK∗t
)
The negativity of that expression is achieved when:
G′′
(
eK∗t
)
(G′(eK∗t )−c)
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
−c
1
eK∗t
(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
) > σ
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Given that
[G′(eK∗t )−c]
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
−c
< 1, a sufficient condition for uniqueness is that:
eK∗t G
′′ (eK∗t )(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
) > σ
Hence a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique Kantian equilibrium
is:
eK∗t G
′′ (eK∗t )(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
) > σ∀0 ≤ eK∗t < G′−1 (c)
Clearly, under that condition, the RHS of the initial expression is decreasing,
and intersects the x axis at eK∗t = G
′−1 (c). Hence, it necessarily intersects the
45◦ line only once.
According to Proposition 1, there always exists at least one Kantian equilib-
rium. Moreover, a simple condition on the production function G (·) suffices to
guarantee the uniqueness of the Kantian equilibrium. In order to have an idea
of the strength of that condition, let us consider the case where G (·) takes the
form of a Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e. G (et) = Ae
α
t with 0 < α < 1.
In that case, the interiority condition implies:
Aαeα−1 > c ⇐⇒ e <
(
Aα
c
) 1
1−α
Hence the condition sufficient for uniqueness becomes:
eK∗t Aα (α− 1)
(
eK∗t
)α−2(
Aα
(
eK∗t
)α−1 −A (eK∗t )α−1) > σ ∀0 ≤ eK∗t < G′−1 (c) =
(
Aα
c
) 1
1−α
This can be simplified to:
α > σ
Thus, under G (et) = Ae
α
t , a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the Kan-
tian equilibrium is α > σ. Obviously, in case of quasi-linear preferences (i.e.
σ = 0), that condition is necessarily satisfied, so that the Kantian equilibrium
exists and is unique.
2.4.2 Nash equilibrium
Let us now consider the case of an economy composed exclusively of Nash play-
ers.
12
Definition 2 A symmetric Nash equilibrium (q = 0) is a distribution of animal
numbers uniform with eit = e
N∗
t such that:
eN∗t =

(
G(eN∗t )
eN∗t
− c
)
ψ
(
G(eN∗t )
eN∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
Proposition 2 states that there exists always a unique symmetric Nash equi-
librium in this economy.
Proposition 2 In an economy with q = 0, there exists a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium if and only if the
following equation admits a unique solution:
eN∗t =

(
G
(
eN
∗
t
)
eN∗t
− c
)
ψ
(
G(eN∗t )
eN∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
Note that interiority requires:
G(eN∗t )
eN∗t
− c > 0.
The equation can be rewritten as:
eN∗t =

(
G
(
eN
∗
t
)
eN∗t
− c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
The derivative of the RHS wrt to eN∗t :
1
1 + σ

(
G
(
eN
∗
t
)
eN∗t
− c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ−1
(1− σ)
ψ
(
G
(
eN
∗
t
)
eN∗t
− c
)−σ [G′ (eN∗t )− G(eN∗t )eN∗t
]
ψeN∗t
Given the interiority condition the first factor and the second factors are
positive. Given the concavity of G
(
eNt
)
, the last factor is negative. Hence the
RHS of the equation is decreasing. Note that when
G(eN∗t )
eN∗t
− c = 0, the RHS
of the equation equals 0. Hence, by continuity, the RHS must intersect the 45◦
line once for an interior eN∗t .
Having shown that there always exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium,
let us now compare the optimal levels of animals prevailing, respectively, at the
13
Nash equilibrium and at the Kantian equilibrium, i.e., eNt and e
K
t . As shown in
the following corollary, the level of animals prevailing at the Kantian equilibrium
is inferior to the one prevailing at the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
it can be shown that the Kantian equilibrium is Pareto-efficient.
Corollary 1 • Given the concavity of G (eNt ), we have:
eK∗t < e
N∗
t
• Note that the Kantian equilibrium is Pareto-efficient.
Proof. Clearly, eK∗t maximizes social welfare when q = 1.
That corollary illustrates the welfare consequences of the Tragedy of (unreg-
ulated) Commons. At the decentralized equilibrium where all agents choose the
number of animals maximizing their own interests, there exists an overuse of
animals, leading to an excessive use of land, which implies a welfare loss for each
shepherd in comparison with what would prevail at the Kantian equilibrium.
2.4.3 q equilibrium with Pure Kantians
Having compared symmetric equilibria in economies that are homogenous in
composition, let us now characterize symmetric equilibria when some individuals
behave like Nash players, whereas other individuals are Kantians. For that
purpose, we will proceed in two stages, and consider first the Pure Kantians.
Definition 3 A symmetric q equilibrium with Pure Kantians (imperfect infor-
mation) is a distribution of animal numbers where a proportion qt of producers
has eit = e
K∗
t and a proportion 1− qt of producers has eit = eN∗t such that:
eK∗t =

(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− c)
ψ
(
G(eK∗t )
eK∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
eN∗t =

(
G(qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t )
qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t − c
)
ψ
(
G(qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t )
qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t − c
)σ

1
1+σ
Proposition 3 examines the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric q equi-
librium with Pure Kantians.
Proposition 3 In an economy with 0 < q < 1, there exists a unique symmetric
q equilibrium with Pure Kantians.
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Proof. There exists a unique symmetric q equilibrium if and only if the following
equation admits a unique solution:
eN∗t =

(
G(qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t )
qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t − c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
Note that interiority requires:
G(qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t )
qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t − c > 0.
Note that the level of animals chosen by Pure Kantians, eK∗t , does not vary
with eNt . Hence the derivative of the RHS wrt to e
N∗
t :
1
1 + σ

(
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ−1
(1− σ)
(
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c
)−σ eN∗t (1−qt)[G′(E∗t )(E∗t )−G(E∗t )]
(E∗t )
2
ψ
where E∗t ≡ qteK∗t + (1− qt)eN∗t .
Given the interiority condition the first factor and the second factors are
positive. Given the concavity of G
(
eNt
)
, the last factor is negative. Hence the
RHS of the equation is decreasing. Note that when
G(qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t )
qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t − c = 0,
the RHS of the equation equals 0. Hence, by continuity, the RHS must intersect
the 45◦ line once for an interior eN∗t .
Thus there exists necessarily a unique symmetric q equilibrium in an econ-
omy composed of a proportion q of Pure Kantians and a fraction 1− q of Nash
players. The following corollary compares the behaviors of Kantians and Nash
players with what prevailed, respectively, at the Kantian equilibrium and at the
Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 2 • The number of animals chosen by Pure Kantian agents is
the same at the Kantian equilibrium and at the q equilibrium.
• The number of animals chosen by Nash agents at the q equilibrium is
strictly larger than at the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The first part of the proof follows from the definition of Pure Kantians,
whose optimal behavior is independent from q.
Second part: we want to show that eN∗t
∣∣
q=0
< eN∗t
∣∣
q>0
. Let us prove this
by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose, by absurdum, that
eN∗t
∣∣
q=0
≥ eN∗t
∣∣
q>0
In the rest, we denote eN∗t
∣∣
q=0
by eN∗0t and e
N∗
t
∣∣
q>0
by eN∗t .
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Let us substitute for eN0t and e
N∗
t using the FOCs:
(
G(qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗0t )
qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗0t − c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
≥

(
G
(
qte
N∗
t +(1−qt)eN
∗
t
)
qteN∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t − c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
Given that G(E)E is decreasing, with e
N∗0
t ≥ eN∗t , and eN∗t > eK∗t , then we
have:
(
G(qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗0t )
qteK∗t +(1−qt)eN∗0t − c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
<

(
G
(
qte
N∗
t +(1−qt)eN
∗
t
)
qteN∗t +(1−qt)eN∗t − c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
a contradiction is reached. Hence we have:
eN∗0t < e
N∗
t
Thus Pure Kantians behave exactly in the same way in an economy composed
only of Pure Kantians, or in an economy where Pure Kantians coexist with a
fraction 1 − q of Nash players. Note, however, that this does not imply that
they enjoy the same welfare level: since Nash players purchase more animals
than Pure Kantians, this pushes the return on animals down for Pure Kantians,
who thus enjoy a lower welfare level in comparison to what they enjoyed at the
Kantian equilibrium.
Regarding Nash players, these tend, at the q equilibrium, to purchase more
animals than at the Nash equilibrium. The reason is that Nash players’ reaction
curves are decreasing in the number of animals purchased by others. Hence, in
presence of a proportion q of Pure Kantians, who tend to purchase fewer animals,
Nash players react by purchasing more animals.
2.4.4 q equilibrium with Impure Kantians
Let us now consider an economy composed of both Nash players and Impure
Kantians. This leads us to the definition of a symmetric q equilibrium with
Impure Kantians.
Definition 4 A symmetric q equilibrium with Impure Kantians (perfect infor-
mation) is a distribution of animal numbers where a proportion qt of producers
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has eit = e
K∗∗
t and a proportion 1− qt of producers has eit = eN∗∗t , such that:
eK∗∗t =
 eK∗∗t qtE∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
eN∗∗t =
 G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t − c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
 11+σ
where E∗∗t ≡ qteK∗∗t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t .
In comparison to the q equilibrium with Pure Kantians, a major difference
lies in the fact that the level of animals purchased by Impure Kantians does
depend on the behavior of Nash players, unlike what prevailed at the q equi-
librium with Pure Kantians. This additional reaction complicates the study of
the existence of a q equilibrium. Proposition 4 identifies a sufficient condition
for the existence of a q equilibrium in the presence of Impure Kantians.
Proposition 4 • In an economy with 0 < q < 1, a sufficient condition for
the existence of a symmetric q equilibrium with Impure Kantians is:
E∗∗t G
′′ (E∗∗t )[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
] > σ ∀eK∗∗t ≤ eN∗∗t
• In an economy with 0 < q < 1 and quasi-linear preferences (σ = 0), the
symmetric q equilibrium with Impure Kantians necessarily exists and is
unique.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to have an idea of the strength of that condition, let us take, here
again, the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function. The condition then
becomes:
α > σ
In the case of quasi-linear preferences (σ = 0), that condition is trivially
satisfied. Thus, under a Cobb-Douglas production function and quasi-linear
preferences, we know for sure that there must exist a symmetric q equilibrium
with Impure Kantians.
2.5 Socialization
Up to now, we considered only the behavior of shepherds concerning the pur-
chase of animals and the production of output. However, in our economy, shep-
herds have another activity, which consists in socializing their children. Assum-
ing that the utility functions are additive in the utility of economic activity and
in the utility of socialization, those two activities can be treated separately.
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We assume that socialization takes place according to a socialization process
a` la Bisin and Verdier (2001) where vertical and oblique socializations interact.
Children are born without type. Each parent has one child. Parents can invest
in a purely physical socialization effort τ it ∈ [0, 1].
The disutility of socialization is given by:
κ
(
τ it
)2
2
(20)
The socialization takes place in two stages. First, the child is subject to the
vertical socialization process through his parent. With a probability τ it , a child
of a parent of type i will take directly the trait of his parent. With a probability
1− τ it , the direct vertical socialization does not take place, and the child takes
the trait of an adult drawn randomly in the cohort of his parent (i.e. the role
model).
Let us denote by P ijt the probability that a child of a parent of type i ∈
{K,N} takes type j ∈ {K,N}. We have:
PKKt = τ
K
t +
(
1− τKt
)
qt
PKNt =
(
1− τKt
)
(1− qt)
PNKt =
(
1− τNt
)
qt
PNNt = τ
N
t +
(
1− τNt
)
(1− qt)
The gains from socialization are due to parental imperfect empathy.
For the parent of type i ∈ {K,N}, let us define V ij , which is the gain to
have a child of type j:
For an economy with Pure Kantians, we have:
V KK =
(
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t )1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
(21)
V KN =
(
G
(
eN∗t
)− ceN∗t )1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
(22)
V NK =
(
eK∗t
E∗t
G (E∗t )− ceK∗t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
(23)
V NN =
(
eN∗t
E∗t
G (E∗t )− ceN∗t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
(24)
where E∗t ≡ qteK∗t + (1− qt)eN∗t .
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For an economy with Impure Kantians, we have:
V KK =
(
eK∗∗t G(qte
K∗∗
t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t )
qteK∗∗t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t − ce
K∗∗
t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)2
2
(25)
V KN =
(
eN∗∗t G(qte
N∗∗
t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t )
qteN∗∗t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t − ce
N∗∗
t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eN∗∗t
)2
2
(26)
V NK =
(
eK∗∗t G(qte
K∗∗
t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t )
qteK∗∗t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t − ce
K∗∗
t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)2
2
(27)
V NN =
(
eN∗∗t G(qte
K∗∗
t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t )
qteK∗∗t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t − ce
N∗∗
t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eN∗∗t
)2
2
(28)
In the present context, imperfect empathy does not consist in parent’s ten-
dency to evaluate outcomes in the light of their own preferences, but, instead, in
parents’s tendency to perfectly anticipate the optimal choices of their children
in the light of their own decision rule (i.e. of the parents themselves). This
explains why V KN includes the term
(
qte
N∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗t
)
in Et: this comes
from the fact that type-K Impure Kantians parents evaluate the outcome of
their child while considering the impact of their child’s decisions on all other
Kantians (”if I were choosing the same level of animals as my child does, which
utility level it would bring me”).
2.5.1 Optimal socialization efforts with Pure Kantians
In the case of pure Kantians and Nash players, the optimal socialization efforts
can be obtained by considering the following problems.
Given the separability of the utility function in the ”consumption compo-
nent” and the ”imperfect altruistic component”, a parent of type N chooses τNt
such that:
max
τNt
−κ
(
τNt
)2
2
+
(
τNt +
(
1− τNt
)
(1− qt)
)
(
eN∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceN∗t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2

+
(
1− τNt
)
qt

(
eK∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2

19
The FOC is:
τN∗t =
qt
κ

(
eN∗t G(E∗t )
E∗t
−ceN∗t
)1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eN∗t )
2
2
−
( eK∗t G(E∗t )E∗t −ceK∗t )1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2

 (29)
A parent of type K chooses τKt such that:
max
τKt
−κ
(
τKt
)2
2
+
(
τKt +
(
1− τKt
)
qt
) [(G (eK∗t )− ceK∗t )1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
]
+
((
1− τKt
)
(1− qt)
) [(G (eN∗t )− ceN∗t )1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
]
The FOC is:
τK∗t =
(1− qt)
κ
[(
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t )1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
−
[(
G
(
eN∗t
)− ceN∗t )1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
]]
(30)
The equation describing the dynamics of qt is given by:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)

(1−qt)
κ
 (G(e
K∗
t )−ceK∗t )
1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2
−
[
(G(eN∗t )−ceN∗t )
1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eN∗t )
2
2
] 
− qtκ

(
eN∗t G(E∗t )
E∗t
−ceN∗t
)1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eN∗t )
2
2
−
( eK∗t G(E∗t )E∗t −ceK∗t )1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2



(31)
2.5.2 Optimal socialization efforts with Impure Kantians
Consider now the situation where Nash players coexist with Impure Kantians.
Socialization efforts are now given as follows.
Nash parents choose a socialization effort τNt such that:
max
τNt
−κ
(
τNt
)2
2
+
(
τNt +
(
1− τNt
)
(1− qt)
)
(
eN∗∗t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eN∗∗t
)2
2

+
(
1− τNt
)
qt

(
eK∗t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)2
2

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The FOC is:
τN∗∗t =
qt
κ

(
eN∗∗t G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−ceN∗∗t
)1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
−
( eK∗t G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t −ceK∗∗t )1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2

 (32)
A parent of type K chooses τKt such that:
max
τKt
−κ
(
τKt
)2
2
+
(
τKt +
(
1− τKt
)
qt
)
(
eK∗∗t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)2
2

+
((
1− τKt
)
(1− qt)
)

(
eN∗∗t G(qte
N∗∗
t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t )
qteNt +(1−qt)eN∗∗t − ce
N∗∗
t
)1−σ
1− σ −
ψ
(
eN∗∗t
)2
2

The FOC is:
τK∗∗t =
(1− qt)
κ

(
eK∗∗t G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−ceK∗∗t
)1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
−

(
eN∗∗t G(eN∗∗t )
eN∗∗t
−ceN∗∗t
)1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2

 (33)
The equation describing the dynamics of qt is given by:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)

(1−qt)
κ

(
eK∗∗t G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−ceK∗∗t
)1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
−

(
eN∗∗t G(eN∗∗t )
eN∗∗t
−ceN∗∗t
)1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2


− qtκ

(
eN∗∗t G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−ceN∗∗t
)1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
−
( eK∗∗t G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t −ceK∗∗t )1−σ
1−σ −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2



(34)
3 Long run dynamics
The previous section aimed at studying the existence and uniqueness of different
kinds of equilibria under a given partition of the population into groups of Nash
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players and Kantian players (either pure or impure). This section studies the
dynamics of heterogeneity.
For that purpose, we will, for the sake of simplification, assume that the
preference parameter σ equals 0, that is, that individuals have quasi-linear pref-
erences.
As above, we will consider first the long-run dynamics of an economy with
Nash players and Pure Kantians, and, then, of an economy with Nash players
and Impure Kantians.
3.1 Nash players and Pure Kantians
Under σ = 0, the dynamics of qt is given by:
qt+1 ≡ F (qt) = qt + qt(1− qt)

(1−qt)
κ
 G (eK∗t )− ceK∗t − ψ(e
K∗
t )
2
2
−
[
G
(
eN∗t
)− ceN∗t − ψ(eN∗t )22 ]

− qtκ
 e
N∗
t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceN∗t −
ψ(eN∗t )
2
2
−
[
eK∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2
]


(35)
Let us study the existence, the uniqueness and the stability of a stationary
equilibrium. As stated in Proposition 5, there exist, in that economy, at least
three stationary equilibria. Two of those stationary equilibria exhibit a homo-
geneous population, composed either of Pure Kantians only, or of Nash players
only. In addition, there exists at least one intermediate stationary equilibrium,
i.e. with a population composed of both Pure Kantians and Nash players.
Proposition 5 Consider an economy composed of Pure Kantians and Nash
players. There exists at least three stationary equilibria:
q∗ = 0
0 < q∗ < 1
q∗ = 1
Proof. See the Appendix.
Whereas Proposition 5 only casts some light on the existence of some station-
ary equilibria with heterogeneous populations, Proposition 6 proposes a condi-
tion that is necessary and sufficient for the uniqueness of a stationary equilibria
with heterogeneous populations.
Proposition 6 A necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the
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intermediate stationary equilibrium 0 < q∗ < 1 is:[ −1
κq∗
] [
G
(
eK∗
)− ceK∗ − ψ (eK∗)2
2
−
[
G
(
eN∗
)− ceN∗ − ψ (eN∗)2
2
]]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
1− q∗
κ
[
−de
N∗
dq
[
G′
(
eN∗
)− c− ψ (eN∗)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
−q
∗
κ
[
− [eN∗ − eK∗]2 G′ (E∗)− G(E∗)E∗
E∗
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
−q
∗
κ
deN∗
dq
[(
eN∗ − eK∗) (1− q∗)G′ (E∗)− G(E∗)E∗
E∗
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0
for all q∗. When the intermediate equilibrium is not unique, there exists an odd
number of intermediate stationary equilibria.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The condition stated in Proposition 6 is based on the following intuition. We
know that a necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of an interme-
diate stationary equilibrium is that the derivative of the term in brackets in the
dynamic equation for qt (which is equal to the differential in socialization efforts
τKt −τNt ) is strictly negative at any intermediate stationary equilibrium.6 Using
that intuition, and computing the derivative of that term at the intermediate
stationary equilibrium, we can decompose the impact of a variation in qt on the
differential in socialization efforts τKt − τNt into four terms, which are presented
on the LHS of the condition in Proposition 6.
The first term, which is negative, captures the effect of cultural substitution
on the socialization effort of both players. A rise in q reduces the socialization
efforts of Pure Kantian parents and it raises the socialization efforts of Nash
parents. The second term, which is positive, captures the impact of a variation
of q on the relative utility gain to have a Pure Kantian child for Pure Kantians
∆V K = V KK − V KN . The third and fourth terms capture the impact of q on
the relative utility gain of having a Nash child for Nash parents, i.e. ∆V N =
V NN − V NK . The third term captures the effect, on ∆V N , of a rise in q for a
given number of animals purchased by Nash players (eN∗ being given). Nash
parents gain more than Pure Kantian parents when q is raised for a given eN∗,
6Necessity: if the slope of the transition function at an intermediate stationary equilibrium
were positive, then we would be sure that there would exist other intermediate stationary
equilibria. Sufficiency: if the slope of the transition function at any intermediate equilibrium
was a negative, then clearly that intermediate equilibrium must be unique.
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so that we have ∆V N > 0.7 As a consequence, the third effect is of negative
sign. On the contrary, the fourth term is positive. It captures the effect of
adjusting eN∗ on ∆V N . When Nash players increase the number of animals,
both Pure Kantians and Nash players have a decrease in utility, but the latter
lose more, implying ∆V N < 0.8
When interpreting that condition for uniqueness, it is important to stress
the crucial role played by the derivative de
N∗
dq , which reflects the extent to which
Nash players adapt the number of animals purchased to the proportion of Pure
Kantians in the population. That derivative is equal to:
deN∗
dq
=
− [eN∗ − eK∗] G′(E∗)−G(E∗)E∗ψE∗
1− (1− q∗)G′(E∗)−
G(E∗)
E∗
ψE∗
> 0
That derivative is positive, since a rise in the proportion of Kantians in the
population induces Nash players to purchase more animals (because Kantians
purchase fewer animals than Nash players, so that a rise in q raises the return on
animals for Nash players). The two positive terms on the RHS of the condition
depend, unlike the negative terms, on the level of de
N∗
dq . The uniqueness of
an intermediate stationary equilibrium (i.e. with heterogeneous population) is
more likely to arise when the reactivity of Nash shepherds is low. However,
when de
N∗
dq is large, the multiplicity of intermediate equilibria can arise. In
other words, a large reactivity of Nash players can generate a bifurcation.9
Finally, let us examine the stability of the stationary equilibria. Proposi-
tion 7 states that homogeneous stationary equilibria are unstable, and states
the necessary and sufficient condition for the (local) stability of intermediate
equilibria. Note that, when the intermediate stationary equilibrium is unique,
it must necessarily be locally stable.
Proposition 7 Consider an economy composed of Pure Kantians and Nash
players.
• Stationary equilibria q∗ = 0 and q∗ = 1 are unstable.
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the local stability of an interme-
7Indeed, a higher proportion of Pure Kantians implies more space per animal for all, but
as Nash players have more animals, this is more beneficial for them.
8The reason is that the rise in eN∗ reduces the availability of space, and thus reduces the
return on each animal. But as Nash players have more animals than Pure Kantians, they
suffer from a larger utility loss.
9From that perspective, a key parameter is the elasticity of output to the number of
animals.
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diate stationary equilibrium 0 < q∗ < 1 is:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 + q∗(1− q∗)

[
−1
κq∗
] [
G
(
eK∗
)− ceK∗ − ψ(eK∗)22 − [G (eN∗)− ceN∗ − ψ(eN∗)22 ]]
+ (1−q
∗)
κ
[
−deN∗dq
[
G′
(
eN∗
)− c− ψ (eN∗)]]
− q∗κ
[
− [eN∗ − eK∗]2 G′(E∗)−G(E∗)E∗E∗ ]
− q∗κ de
N∗
dq
[(
eN∗ − eK∗) (1− q∗)G′(E∗)−G(E∗)E∗E∗ ]

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
< 1
• When the intermediate stationary equilibrium is unique, this is also locally
stable. Given the continuity of F (qt), the unique intermediate equilibrium
is then also globally stable on [0, 1].
• When the intermediate stationary equilibrium is not unique, we necessarily
have an odd number of intermediate equilibria. Those for which the above
condition is satisfied are locally stable, and the others are unstable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In sum, this section shows that, provided the reactivity of Nash players de
N∗
dq
is sufficiently small, so that the intermediate stationary equilibrium is unique,
we know that any economy starting with some proportion of Pure Kantians will
still exhibit, in the long-run, a constant positive proportion of Pure Kantians.
On the contrary, when the reactivity of Nash players is large, so that there exists
a multiplicity of intermediate equilibria, stability may not prevail.
3.2 Nash players and Impure Kantians
Assuming, here again, quasi-linear preferences, the equation for the dynamics
of qt is now:
qt+1 ≡ H (qt) = qt+qt(1−qt)

(1−qt)
κ
 e
K∗∗
t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
−
[
eN∗∗t G(e
N∗∗
t )
eN∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
]

− qtκ
 e
N∗∗
t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
−
[
eK∗t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
]


(36)
Let us first study the existence of a stationary equilibrium.
Obviously, q = 0 and q = 1 are stationary equilibria. Proposition 8 summa-
rizes our results for existence.
Proposition 8 Consider an economy composed of Impure Kantians and Nash
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players. There exists at least three stationary equilibria:
q∗∗ = 0
0 < q∗∗ < 1
q∗∗ = 1
Proof. See the Appendix.
Whereas Proposition 8 states that a heterogeneous stationary equilibrium
exists, it does not guarantee that this is unique. Proposition 9 provides a con-
dition that is necessary and sufficient for the uniqueness of the intermediate
equilibrium.10
Proposition 9 A necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the
intermediate stationary equilibrium 0 < q∗∗ < 1 is:
−1
κ
[
V KK − V KN + (V NN − V NK)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
(1− q∗∗)
κ

(
eK∗∗ − eN∗∗) eK∗∗
E∗∗
(
G′ (E∗∗)− G (E
∗∗)
E∗∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+de
N∗∗
dq

(1− q∗∗)e
K∗∗
E∗∗
(
G′ (E∗∗)− G (E
∗∗)
E∗∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
− [G′ (eN∗∗)− c− ψeN∗∗]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+


−q
∗∗
κ

− [eK∗∗ − eN∗∗]2(G′ (E∗∗)− G (E∗∗)
E∗∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+de
N∗∗
dq
[
− 1
E∗∗
(
eK∗∗ − eN∗∗) (1− q∗∗)(G′ (E∗∗)− G (E∗∗)
E∗∗
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+de
K∗∗
dq
[
q∗∗
eN∗∗
E∗∗
(
G′ (E∗∗)− G (E
∗∗)
E∗∗
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−

< 0
for all q∗∗. When the intermediate equilibrium is not unique, there exists an odd
number of intermediate stationary equilibria.
Proof. See the Appendix.
10That condition states that the derivative
d[τKt −τNt ]
dqt
is strictly negative at any intermediate
stationary equilibrium.
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In comparison with the condition for uniqueness of the intermediate equi-
librium in the case of Pure Kantians, the condition stated in Proposition 9 is
more complex, since it involves the reactions of Impure Kantians in terms of
animal purchase, i.e. de
K∗∗
dq . On the contrary, in the case of Pure Kantians,
there was not such a reaction, since Pure Kantians are always purchasing the
same number of animals, independently from the composition and behavior of
the rest of the population. This is clearly not the case for Impure Kantians.
Let us now interpret the condition given in Proposition 9. The first term on
the RHS of the condition in Proposition 9, which is negative, captures the effect
of cultural substitution. A rise in q reduces the socialization efforts of Impure
Kantian parents, since those parents rely more on oblique socialization (i.e. the
role models) when they are more numerous in the population. On the contrary,
a rise in q raises the socialization efforts of Nash parents, who can rely less on
oblique socialization.
The first term of the first bracket is positive: it is the effect of a change in
q on the utility for an Impure Kantian parent to have an Impure Kantian child
for a given number of animals for type N . The second term in the first bracket
is the effect, for a given q, of a change in the number of animals purchased by
Nash players on the utility for an Impure Kantian parent to have an Impure
Kantian child.
Let us now interpret the second bracket. The first term in the second bracket
is the impact, for a given number of animals for both types, of a change in q
on the utility for a Nash parent to have a Nash child. The second term in the
second bracket is the impact, for a given q, of a change in the number of animals
purchased by Nash players on the utility for a Nash parent to have a Nash child.
The third term in the second brackets is the impact, for a given q, of a change in
the number of animals purchased by Impure Kantians on the utility for a Nash
parent to have a Nash child.
Proposition 10 summarizes our results regarding the stability of the three
equilibria.
Proposition 10 Consider an economy composed of Impure Kantians and Nash
players.
• The stationary equilibrium q∗∗ = 0 is non hyperbolic and is unstable.
• The stationary equilibrium q∗∗ = 1 is hyperbolic and is unstable.
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the local stability of an interme-
diate stationary equilibrium 0 < q∗∗ < 1 is that
d
[
τK∗∗t − τN∗∗t
]
dqt
< 0
holds at the intermediate stationary equilibrium.
• When the intermediate stationary equilibrium is unique, this is also locally
stable. Given the continuity of H (qt), the unique intermediate equilibrium
is then also globally stable on [0, 1].
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• When the intermediate stationary equilibrium is not unique, we necessarily
have an odd number of intermediate equilibria. Those for which the above
condition is satisfied are locally stable, and the others are unstable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 10 shows that homogeneous stationary equilibria are not stable.
Thus, starting from an economy composed of both Nash players and Impure
Kantians, it is not possible that only one type of rationality survives in the long-
run. In other terms, it is necessarily the case that both types of rationality will
survive in the long-run. Proposition 10 also states that, when the intermediate
stationary equilibrium is unique (which is not always guaranteed), it is also
locally stable. Thus in the case of uniqueness of the intermediate equilibrium,
proportions of the two types of players will stabilize in the long-run.
In comparison with the economy composed of Nash players and Pure Kan-
tians, the main difference lies in the fact, mentioned above, that the uniqueness
condition for the intermediate equilibrium is more complex, since it includes
additional terms depending on the reaction of Impure Kantians to changes in
the composition of the population , i.e. de
K∗∗
dq , something which was absent in
the case of Pure Kantians.
4 Policy (1): quotas
Up to now, we considered an economy at the laissez-faire, without public inter-
vention. However, it is well known that the laissez-faire situation gives rise, in
the present context, to a socially suboptimal result: the Tragedy of the Com-
mons. In our context, the laissez-faire is characterized by a paradox: shepherds
are buying, on average, too many animals, and the total product, in terms of
wool, is too low, due to the congestion on land which reduces output per animal.
Let us now consider the impact of public policy on social outcomes. A
first candidate for policy in the context of the Tragedy of the Commons is the
imposition of a quota on the number of animals. We now suppose that the
government fixes a quota equal to e¯, which satisfies the following constraints:
eK∗ ≤ e¯ < lim
qt→0
eN∗t (37)
The lower bound of the quota, eK∗, coincides with the social optimum. Because
of political constraints, it is likely that the quota will exceed that level. The
second part of the inequality requires that Nash players are always strictly
constrained by the quota. Indeed, we know that eN∗t is increasing in qt, so that
it takes its minimal value when there are no Kantian players.
Let us now consider the impact of imposing the quota e¯ on social outcomes.
For that purpose, we now suppose that c = 0. Furthermore, we will also impose
the following cost of shepherd effort:
ψ
2
3
(
eit
)3/2
(38)
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Moreover, we will now suppose that the production function F
(
eit, s
i
t
)
has
the following Cobb-Douglas form:
yit = A
(
eit
)1/2 (
sit
)1/2
(39)
where sit ≡ e
i
t
Et
is the amount of land used by the producer i. Hence, the total
product per shepherd becomes:
yit =
eit
Et
AE
1/2
t =
eit
Et
G (Et) (40)
Thus this modeling is a special case of the one in the previous section, where
G (Et) = AE
1/2
t .
4.1 Pure Kantians vs Nash players
Does the imposition of the quota e¯ on the number of sheep per shepherd con-
tribute to reduce the total number of animals, and, hence, allow the society to
reach a Pareto improvement? Proposition 11 shows that this is not necessarily
the case. It may indeed be the case, under some conditions, that introducing a
quota makes the Tragedy of the Commons even worse than at the laissez-faire.
Proposition 11 Let us consider an economy with a quota e¯ ∈ [eK∗, eN∗[.
• There exists some intervals for e¯ such that:
qQ < qLF
• There exists some intervals for e¯ such that:
EQ > ELF
Proof. See in the Appendix.
Proposition 11 is quite counterintuitive. One would expect that the intro-
duction of a quota would necessarily reduce the extent of land congestion. The
intuition behind Proposition 11 goes as follows. True, in the case where the
partition of the population into Nash players and Pure Kantian players were
constant, imposing a quota would, by reducing the number of sheep of Nash
players, reduce the total number of animals with respect to the laissez-faire,
and, hence, decrease the extent of land congestion.
However, we consider here an economy where the partition of the population
into the two types of shepherds is varying over time. Proposition 11 states that
a high quota increases the proportion of Nash players. The rational goes as
follows. The quota affects socialization gains of each type of parents. On the
one hand, it reduces the gain to have a Pure Kantian child for Pure Kantian
parents by decreasing the loss to have a child who plays Nash (as the latter will
be closer to the optimum for Pure Kantians). One the other hand, when it is
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high, the quota always increases the gain to have a Nash child for Nash parents.
Indeed, for a given q, the quotas reduces the total number of animals which
benefits to each type of children by increasing the gain per animal purchased.
However, since Nash children have more animals, they benefit more from this
rise.
Furthermore, Proposition 11 states that some level of quota increases the
total number of animals purchased. The quota has two opposite effects. First
it reduces the total number of animals purchased by reducing the number of
animals purchased by Pure Kantians. This is the standard intensive margin
effect. Second, the quota has also an effect on the proportions of the two types
of agents, that is, an extensive margin effect. Actually, the quota increases the
total number of animals purchased by increasing the proportion of Nash players.
When the quota is high the second effect outweighs the first one. The increase
in the proportion of Nash players is large when the quota has a high negative
impact on socialization gains for Pure Kantian parents. The increase in the
proportion of Nash players is low when the cultural substitution effect is large.
Indeed, through this effect, any increase in the proportion of Nash players tends
to reduce the future proportion of this type of agents. Due to the concavity of
utility functions, the cultural substitution effect is low compared to the change
in socialization gain so that the increase in the proportion of Nash players is
substantial. Hence, the total number of animals purchased increases.
Let us illustrate this proposition by a simple numerical example. For that
purpose, Figure 1 shows the total number of animals (y axis) as a function of
the prevailing quota e¯ (x axis). It is straighforward to see that the relationship
between the total number of animals and the quota is not monotonous. The
extreme point on the right of the figure is the total number of animals when the
quota is not constraining for Nash players. Then, when we move progressively
to the left (and consider thus lower values for the quota e¯), the quota becomes
constraining for Nash players. But the total number of animals associated with
the quota is increasing with the quota e¯, up to e¯ = 0.31. When we consider even
more restrictive quotas, then the total number of animals falls. The extreme
point on the left coincides with the social optimum, where Nash players purchase
the same number of animals as Pure Kantians.
Actually, if the government wants to reduce the total number of animals
by imposing a quota, Figure 1 shows that quotas that restrict the number of
animals purchased by Nash players by less than 12 % contributes not to reduce,
but to raise the total number of animals with respect to the laissez-faire. In
other words, imposing quotas that are not strong enough worsens the Tragedy
of the Commons.
4.2 Impure Kantians vs Nash players
Let us now consider the introduction of a quota on the number of animals in the
case of an economy composed Nash players and Impure Kantians. The problem
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Figure 1: Total number of animals as a function of the quota (A = 1/2, ψ = 12,
κ = 1/2).
of the Impure Kantian is, under σ = c = 0:
max
eKt
(
eKt
Et
AE
1/2
t
)
− ψ 2
3
(
eKt
)3/2
s.t. Et ≡ qteKt + (1− qt)e¯
or alternatively,
max
eKt
(
eKt A
(
qte
K
t + (1− qt)e¯
)−1/2)− ψ 2
3
(
eKt
)3/2
The optimal eK∗∗t satisfies:
A
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)e¯
)−1/2
+
−1
2
qte
K∗∗
t A
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)e¯
)−3/2−ψ (eK∗∗t )1/2 = 0
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Two cases can arise, depending on whether eK∗∗ ≷ e¯.
When eK∗∗ ≥ e¯, it is necessarily the case that the introduction of a quota
reduces the amount of animals. Indeed, we have:
qLF eK∗∗ + (1− qLF )eN∗∗ > qQe¯+ (1− qQ)e¯ = e¯
since both eK∗∗ ≥ e¯ and eN∗∗ > e¯.
Let us now focus on the second case, where eK∗∗ < e¯.
Proposition 12 Consider an economy with a quota e¯ ∈ [eK∗, eN∗∗[. Suppose
that eN∗∗ > 6eK∗∗
• We have:
qQ < qLF
• There exists some intervals for e¯ such that:
EQ > ELF
Proof. See in the Appendix.
Again for the case of Impure Kantians, a quota may have a counter-intuitive
effect by increasing the total number of animals purchased. As opposed to the
case of Pure Kantians, this is not true for all parameters combination. The
rational is as follows. Unlike Pure Kantians, Impure Kantians react to the
introduction of a quota by increasing the number of animals. This reaction
has two opposite effects. First, it directly increases the total number of animal
purchased. However, it also indirectly affects the total number of animal by
impacting socialization gains (and thus the proportion of Nash players). In
particular, it reduces the gain for Nash parents to have Nash children (letting
socialization gains for Impure Kantian parents unchanged). This second effect
negatively affects the total number of animal by rising the proportion of Impure
Kantians in the economy. When eN∗∗ > 6eK∗∗, implying that the socialization
effort of Nash parents is high, then the first effect dominates and the overall
impact of the quota is an increase in the total number of animals.
Let us illustrate this counterintuitive case numerically. For that purpose,
Figure 2 shows, as the previous figure, the total number of animals as a function
of the quota e¯ . Here again, the relationship between the total number of animals
and the quota is not monotonous. The extreme point on the right is the total
number of animals when the quota is not constraining at all, neither for Impure
Kantians, nor for Nash players. Then, when we consider thus lower values
for the quota, the quota becomes constraining for Nash players (and not for
Impure Kantians). But the total number of animals associated with the quota
is increasing with the quota e¯, up to e¯ = 0.24. When we consider even more
restrictive quotas, then the total number of animals falls. The extreme point
on the left coincides with the case where e¯ is so low that both Nash players and
Impure Kantians are constrained by the quota.
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Figure 2: Total number of animals as a function of the quota (A = 1/2, ψ = 12,
κ = 1/2).
This figure shows that, from a qualitative perspective, the main result ob-
tained when considering Pure Kantians also hold when considering Impure Kan-
tians: in both cases, a soft quota contributes to raise the total number of an-
imals. Note, however, that, from a quantitative perspective, some important
differences arise.
5 Policy (2): Pigouvian tax
When facing the Tragedy of the Commons, another standard policy tool consists
in introducing a Pigouvian tax on the number of animals. The underlying
intuition goes as follows. In our economy, Nash players (and, to some extent,
Impure Kantians) do not, when choosing the number of animals, internalize
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the impact of the number of animals on the society. The negative production
externality takes the following form: a higher number of animals tends, by
reducing the available space for other animals, to reduce the marginal product
of all other animals in the society.
In order to make producers internalize the social consequences of their deci-
sions, a government can introduce a Pigouvian tax on animals. If one denotes
such a tax by >, the price of each animals then increases from c to c (1 +>).
The introduction of such a tax has two effects on the total number of animals:
one in terms of intensive margins and one in terms of extensive margins.
Regarding the intensive margin effect, one expects that, by increasing the
price of animals, the tax is likely, by a substitution effect, to reduce the number
of animals purchased by each shepherd, and, hence, to reduce the total number
of animals, to make it closer to the social optimum level. But the intensive
margin effect is here made ambiguous by the fact that, as Kantians reduce their
number of animals, Nash players react by increasing their number of animals.
Thus the impact of the tax on intensive margins is here more complex than
in the case of a quota (where Pure Kantians were not affected at all, but well
Impure Kantians).
This ambiguous intensive margin effect may be counterbalanced by another
effect, in extensive margins: the tax, by modifying the achieved utility levels
by the two types of agents, may modify the composition of the population. It
may be the case that the tax, by affecting the incentives to socialize children in
different ways across types, raises the proportion of Nash players. This extensive
margin effect also affects the influence of the tax at the aggregate level.
5.1 Pure Kantians vs Nash players
In the case of Pure Kantians, given that E = q(>)eK∗(>) + (1− q(>))eN∗(>),
the effect of the tax on the total number animals is:
∂E
∂> =
∂q
∂>e
K∗(>) + q(>)∂e
K∗(>)
∂> −
∂q
∂>e
N∗(>) + (1− q(>))∂e
N∗(>)
∂>
This can be rewritten as:
∂E
∂> =
∂q
∂>
[
eK∗(>)− eN∗(>)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin effect
+ q(>)∂e
K∗(>)
∂> + (1− q(>))
∂eN∗(>)
∂>︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive margin effect
We know that eK∗(>) < eN∗(>), but since the sign of ∂q∂> is unknown, the
extensive margin effect is ambiguous. Regarding the intensive margin effect,
an important difference with respect to the case of the quota is that, in the
case of the tax, both types of agents are affected by the policy intervention.11
The impact on the number of animals for Pure Kantians is unambiguous: Pure
11Of course, in a first-best setting, the government would observe the types of agents, and
would only tax those who generates negative externalities (i.e. Nash players).
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Kantians will, as a consequence of the tax, reduce the number of animals they
purchase. We thus have ∂e
K∗(>)
∂> < 0.
Concerning the impact of the tax on the number of animals purchased by
Nash players, two opposite effects are at work. First, the rise in the price of
animals is likely to make Nash players reduce their number of animals. But at
the same time, the fall in the number of animals purchased by Pure Kantians
pushes Nash players to purchase more animals. Actually, the two effects on
∂eN∗(>)
∂> can be presented as follows:
∂eN∗(>)
∂> =
∂eN∗(>)
∂>
∣∣∣∣
eK∗constant︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
∂eN∗(>)
∂eK∗(>)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
∂eK∗(>)
∂>︸ ︷︷ ︸
−︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
The impact of the tax on the number of animals purchased by Nash players
is negative when the first, direct effect dominates the second, indirect effect
(reaction effect). On the contrary, when the reaction effect dominates, Nash
players purchase more animals under the tax. Numerically, it can be shown
that, when q is close to 1, it is possible that the second effect dominates the first
one, implying that Nash shepherds purchase more animals under the tax than
without the tax.12 However, for lower values of q, the direct effect generally
dominates the indirect effect, so that ∂e
N∗(>)
∂> < 0. Thus in general the reaction
effect is a second-order effect, which is dominated by the direct effect of the tax.
As a consequence, we obtain in that case that the overall intensive margin effect
of the tax on the total number of animals is negative. However, given that the
impact of the tax on the partition of the population is unknown, the extensive
margin effect is not clear. One can hardly know, in theory, what is the total
effect of the tax on the number of animals.
The rest of this section examines numerically the impact of introducing
a Pigouvian tax on animals on the degree of severity of the Tragedy of the
Commons. Given political constraints (lobbying groups, media), policy-makers
are constrained in the extent to which thay can impose high taxes. Hence, it
makes sense to examine the impact, in a third-best world, of small taxes on the
extent of the Tragedy of the Commons. This is the task carried out in Table 1
for different values of the ratio of parameters A (productivity of animals) and
ψ (disutility of the number of animals). To make the link with the previous
section, Table 1 also compares the effects of the tax with the impact of quotas
of limited sizes.13
12Note, however, that, since q = 1 is not a stable stationnary equilibrium, one should not
pay too much attention to that extreme case.
13Table 1 is based on κ = 0.5 and c = 0.5.
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E
A/ψ LF quotas tax
-10% wrt LF -20% wrt LF -50% wrt LF 10% 20% 30%
0.100 0.054 0.059 0.060 0.054 0.052 0.050 0.046
0.125 0.065 0.070 0.072 0.068 0.063 0.060 0.054
0.250 0.112 0.121 0.123 0.118 0.106 0.100 0.090
Table 1: Effects of the quota and the tax on total number of animals (Pure
Kantians vs Nash).
Table 1 invites several comments. First, Table 1 shows that, when the ratio
A/ψ goes up, the total number of animals purchased increases in all cases. This
result is expected: a higher productivity per animal (i.e. a higher A) and a lower
disutility of caring for animals (i.e. a lower ψ) pushes all individuals, whatever
their type, to purchase more animals, implying a rise in E.
Second, Table 1 also confirms the findings of the previous section: quotas
with a limited constraining power do not decrease, but increase the total number
of animals purchased. Thus quotas can, as in the previous section, worsen the
Tragedy of the Commons in comparison to the laissez-faire.
Third, and more importantly, taxes on animals, even of small sizes, tend to
reduce the total number of animals with respect to the laissez-faire. Thus the
overall effect of the tax is here to reduce the number of animals, whatever the
level of the tax. Contrary to the quota, even a small tax can reduce the Tragedy
of the Commons. Thus the tax and the quota have quite different effects in the
context of reducing the Tragedy of the Commons. The underlying intuition is
that the tax affects here the quantity of animals purchased by all individuals,
and not only by Nash players (unlike what prevails under the quota).
In sum, it appears that, to reduce the Tragedy of the Commons in a world
of political constraints, a small tax may perform better than a small quota
(which can make things worse than the laissez-faire), even though in a first-best
world the quota performs better (by targetting only the providers of negative
externalities, i.e. Nash players). Indeed, as the small quota may raise the total
number of animals, this rise is equivalent with what would have been achieved
while subsidizing - instead of taxing - the sheep.
5.2 Impure Kantians vs Nash players
In the case of Impure Kantians, given that E∗∗ = q(>)eK∗∗(>)+(1−q(>))eN∗∗(>),
the effect of the tax on the total number animals can be written as:
∂E
∂> =
∂q
∂>e
K∗∗(>) + q(>)∂e
K∗∗(>)
∂> −
∂q
∂>e
N∗∗(>) + (1− q(>))∂e
N∗∗(>)
∂>
This can be rewritten as:
∂E
∂> =
∂q
∂>
[
eK∗∗(>)− eN∗∗(>)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin effect
+ q(>)∂e
K∗∗(>)
∂> + (1− q(>))
∂eN∗∗(>)
∂>︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive margin effect
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We have eK∗∗(>) < eN∗∗(>), but the sign of ∂q∂> is unknown, so that the
extensive margin effect remains, here again, ambiguous. Regarding the intensive
margin effect, a major difference with respect to the case of Pure Kantians is
that Impure Kantians may or may not reduce their number of animals, since
they react to what Nash players do (unlike Pure Kantians). We have:
∂eK∗∗(>)
∂> =
∂eK∗∗(>)
∂>
∣∣∣∣
eN∗∗constant︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
∂eK∗∗(>)
∂eN∗∗(>)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
∂eN∗∗(>)
∂>︸ ︷︷ ︸
?︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
∂eN∗∗(>)
∂> =
∂eN∗∗(>)
∂>
∣∣∣∣
eK∗∗constant︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
∂eN∗∗(>)
∂eK∗∗(>)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
∂eK∗∗(>)
∂>︸ ︷︷ ︸
?︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
Hence the global intensive margin effect is even more ambiguous in this case
than in the case of Pure Kantians. Adding to this the - still unknown - extensive
margins effect, we can hardly find some analytical result concerning the impact
of the tax.
Turning to numerical analysis, Table 2 compares the impact of quotas and
taxes on the total number of animals in the case of Impure Kantians.14 Table
2 shows that taxes, even when they are low, can reduce the total number of
animals with respect to the laissez-faire. On the contrary, weak quotas tend to
make things even worse than at the laissez-faire, by implying a rise in the total
number of animals. Only quotas restraining Nash players by 50 % can achieve
a reduction in the total number of animals, whereas a 10 % tax on animals can
achieve such a reduction.
E
A/ψ LF quotas tax
-10% wrt LF -20% wrt LF -50% wrt LF 10% 20% 30%
0.100 0.059 0.059 0.061 0.050 0.058 0.056 0.050
0.125 0.071 0.072 0.075 0.068 0.067 0.066 0.060
0.250 0.121 0.121 0.125 0.110 0.115 0.109 0.083
Table 2: Effects of the quota and the tax on total number of animals (Impure
Kantians vs Nash).
Although non exhaustive, our numerical simulations reveal that taxes and
quotas are far from equivalent, in the sense that these have quite different capac-
ities to reduce the severity of the Tragedy of the Commons. We know that, in a
first-best world, applying a quota e¯ = eK∗ decentralizes the social optimum, by
internalizing all congestion externalities. Thus in a first-best world the quota
14Table 1 is based on κ = 0.5 and c = 0.5.
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is superior to the tax. However, in a third-best world with strong political
constraints, governments can hardly implement strong quotas (or high taxes),
and in that context, our simulations suggest that the tax perfoms better than
the quota. Whereas weak quotas worsen the Tragedy even more in comparison
to the laissez-faire, Pigouvian taxes can, even with low levels, reduce the total
number of animals. That result is particularly relevant for governments facing
political constraints preventing them from implementing constraining quotas. In
such a third-best world, the tax dominates the quota, by leading to a reduction
of the severity of the Tragedy.
6 Relative fitness of (Im)Pure Kantians
Up to now, we derived separate results for two populations, composed either
of Nash players and Pure Kantians, or of Nash players and Impure Kantians.
One may be curious to know, from an evolutionary perspective, which trait
is the fittest in the context of the Tragedy of the Commons: being a Pure or
an Impure Kantian? Put it differently, the question is to know which type of
Kantians would be the most numerous in the long-run? At first glance, it is
tempting to believe that Impure Kantians are more fit than Pure Kantians,
simply because they are better informed, since they take into account, unlike
Pure Kantians, that a fraction 1− q of the population plays Nash. But it is not
clear that being more informed implies necessarily to be more fit.
The question of the relative fitness of the two types of Kantian players is
also most relevant for policy purposes. Indeed, suppose that a government can,
at no cost, convert Kantian agents in either Pure or Impure Kantians. The
question is then to know which type of Kantian morality (Pure or Impure) the
government should promote, that is, which type of Kantian morality would lead
to the lowest congestion of land?
6.1 Reaction functions
Let us first come back to the temporary equilibrium, to examine which type of
Kantians derives the highest temporal utility for a given partition qt. For the
sake of simplicity, we focus here on the case of quasi-linear preferences (σ = 0)
and assume c = 0. As above, we also suppose a Cobb-Douglas production
function, which implies:
G (Et) = AE
α
t
as well as the disutility from raising animals:
2
3
ψ
(
eit
)3/2
Remind first that the optimal number of animals in the two distinct games
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are given by:
A (E∗t )
α−1 − ψ (eN∗t )1/2 = 0
αAeK∗α−1t − ψ
(
eK∗t
)1/2
= 0 ⇐⇒ eK∗t =
(
ψ
Aα
) 1
α− 3
2
A (E∗∗t )
α−1 − ψ (eN∗∗t )1/2 = 0
A (E∗∗t )
α−1
+ (α− 1)qteK∗∗t A (E∗∗t )α−2 − ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)1/2
= 0
Let us now compare those two games. To have analytical results, we consider
the case where α = 1/2. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 13 Suppose G (Et) = AE
1/2
t , v
(
eit
)
= 23ψ
(
eit
)3/2
and suppose a
given qt.
• The comparison of the q equilibrium involving Pure Kantians with the q
equilibrium involving Impure Kantians yields,
when qt = 0 or qt = 1:
eK∗t = e
K∗∗
t
eN∗t = e
N∗∗
t
when 0 < qt < 1:
eK∗t < e
K∗∗
t
eN∗t > e
N∗∗
t
• We also have:
if qt = 0 or qt = 1, then E
∗
t = E
∗∗
t
if 0 < qt < 1, then E
∗
t < E
∗∗
t
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 13 states that, under this analytical case, Impure Kantians tend,
for a given partition of the population 0 < qt < 1, to purchase more animals
than Pure Kantians, whereas Nash players purchase more animals when they
compete with Pure Kantians than when they compete with Impure Kantians.
Quite interestingly, under an interior qt, the total number of animals is lower
at the q equilibrium with Pure Kantians than at the q equilibrium with Impure
Kantians. The underlying intuition goes as follows. At the equilibrium, the
effect of the higher number of animals purchased by Impure Kantians dominates
the lower number of animals purchased, as a reaction, by Nash players.
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6.2 Socialization and dynamics
The previous subsection shows that, under particular functional forms, the total
number of animals is, for a given partition qt, lower when the economy is com-
posed of Pure Kantians and Nash players than when it is composed of Impure
Kantians and Nash players. Although interesting, that result does not tell us
which Kantian type leads to the smallest aggregate number of animals in the
long-run, since that result relies on a given partition. The dynamics of hetero-
geneity is different when the economy is composed of Pure or Impure Kantians,
so that there is no obvious reason why one should expect that q takes the same
long-run level in the two cases.
Given the large number of effects at work, the analysis of the relative fitness
of the Pure and Impure Kantians has to carried out numerically. For that pur-
pose, Table 3 shows, under the production function G (Et) = AE
1/2
t and under
the desutility 23ψ
(
eit
)3/2
, the proportion of Kantian players at the stationary
equilibrium for different values of the ratio of parameters A/ψ, as well as the
associated total number of animals E.15 To cast light on the relative fitness of
Pure and Impure Kantians, we distinguish between two kinds of games: on the
one hand, Pure Kantians versus Nash players, and, on the other hand, Impure
Kantians versus Nash players.
Parameters Pure Kantians vs Nash Impure Kantians vs Nash
A/ψ q∗ E∗ q∗∗ E∗∗
0.025 0.14 0.02 0.52 0.02
0.050 0.25 0.05 0.53 0.04
0.100 0.55 0.08 0.58 0.09
0.125 0.62 0.09 0.60 0.11
0.250 0.66 0.19 0.65 0.21
0.500 0.67 0.38 0.66 0.42
Table 3: Relative fitness of Pure and Impure Kantians
Regarding the relative fitness of Pure and Impure Kantians, Table 3 shows
that the two types of Kantian agents exhibit quite different degrees of fitness.
In all parametrizations considered, Impure Kantians represent more than 50 %
of the population, and are thus always more fit than Nash players. This is true
whether there is a large number of animals or not, that is, whether the size of
negative congestion externalities is large or not. Thus, if one reminds that, in
our model, the interior stationary equilibrium q equals ∆V
K
∆V K+∆V N
, and depends
on the relative intolerance of Kantian and Nash players, we can conclude that
Impure Kantians are, under all our parametrizations, more intolerant than Nash
15The parameter κ is set to 0.5.
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players, independently of the extent of the Tragedy of the Commons.16
Turning now to Pure Kantians, we can see that their prevalence at the
stationary equilibrium varies much more with the postulated ratio A/ψ. When
A/ψ is low, that is, when individuals purchase a small number of animals, the
proportion of Pure Kantians at the stationary equilibrium is low. They are
then clearly dominated, in terms of fitness, by Nash players. However, when
the ratio A/ψ increases (implying that both types of agents purchase more
animals), then Pure Kantians become more numerous than Nash players at the
stationary equilibrium. Thus, it is only when the Tragedy of the Commons is
more severe that Pure Kantians become more intolerant than Nash players.
Comparing the fitness of Pure and Impure Kantians, we can thus conclude
that, whereas Impure Kantians are always more intolerant than Nash players,
independently of the extent of the Tragedy of the Commons, and are thus always
dominant in the long-run, this is not true for Pure Kantians, who are more
intolerant than Nash players only when the Tragedy is quite severe. If one now
compares directly the prevalence of the two types of Kantians at the long-run
equilibrium, we see that, for low levels of the ratio A/ψ, Impure Kantians are
more numerous than Pure Kantians, whereas, for higher levels of A/ψ, Pure
Kantians are more numerous than Impure Kantians. Thus the fitness ranking
between Pure and Impure Kantians is not invariant to the parametrizations.
Let us now turn back to the question of the most adequate type of Kantian
in the context of the Tragedy of the Commons. Does one type of Kantian
lead to lower congestion? When considering that question, a first important
thing to stress is that adopting a static perspective may be quite misleading.
True, as we showed in the previous section, the total number of animals is, for
a given partition q, lower under Pure Kantians than under Impure Kantians.
However, thinking in terms of a given partition is quite restrictive here, since
the long-run prevalence of Kantians depends strongly on which type of Kantian
is considered, and this definitely affects the size of congestion in the long-run.
As shown in Table 3, under a low ratio A/ψ, Pure Kantians are so few at
the stationary equilibrium that the total number of animals is larger in the
presence of Pure Kantians than under Impure Kantians. Thus the long-run
partition of the population definitely matters to see which type of Kantians is
the most favorable to minoring the Tragedy of the Commons. One cannot make
comparisons for a given partition, since the partition definitely varies with the
16The underlying intuition goes as follows. For Impure Kantians, we know that the case
V KK − V KN︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆VK
> V NN − V NK︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆VN
is plausible, since we have V KK = V NK , so that the above inequality becomes:
2V KK > V NN + V KN
This inequality is plausible, since V KN is relatively smaller (since an Impure Kantian then
generalize eN to their group - and thus to the whole society -, so that negative externalities
due to congestion reach their maximum. V KN being relatively smaller, we expect the above
inequality to hold, leading to q > 1/2.
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type of Kantians, whose degrees of relative fitness differ.
Note, however, that examining the prevalence of Kantians at the stationary
equilibrium is, although necessary, not sufficient to be able to know which type
of Kantians makes the Tragedy of the Commons less severe. The reason is that
the extent of the Tragedy depends not only on extensive margins (proportions
of Kantians and Nash players), but, also, on intensive margins (how many an-
imals purchased by each individual). Hence focusing only on the proportion of
Kantians may oversimplify the picture. To illustrate this, let us take the case
where A/ψ equals 0.100. In that case, Impure Kantians are, at the stationary
equilibrium, more numerous than Pure Kantians (0.58 versus 0.55). However,
the total number of animals E is larger when Nash players face Impure Kan-
tians than when Nash players face Pure Kantians. Thus, one should be cautious
before concluding that the presence of the most fit Kantian type leads to the
most favorable environmental outcome. Here again, the aggregate number of
animals depends both on extensive and intensive margins effects.17
7 Conclusions
Experiments of common pool resource games show that individuals, when facing
the possibility to extract a common resource at the expense of others, do not
extract as much as what rational self-oriented Nash players would extract in
theory. One possible rationalization of those facts consists in assuming that not
all agents have the same rationality.
The goal of this paper was to reexamine the Tragedy of the Commons in a
context where individuals have different rationalities, some being Nash players,
whereas others are Kantian players (Pure or Impure), and where the parti-
tion of the population into those different types of rationalities follows a verti-
cal/oblique socialization process a` la Bisin and Verdier (2001). We characterized
various types of temporary equilibria (i.e. for a given partition of the popula-
tion), with either only Nash players, or with only Kantian players, or with both.
Then, when studying the long-run dynamics of heterogeneity, we examined the
issues of existence, uniqueness and stability of stationary equilibria, i.e. equi-
libria with a fixed partition of the population into different types of rationality.
Our main result is that, quite paradoxically, introducing a quota on the
number of sheep per shepherd can, in some conditions, lead to a rise in the extent
of congestion of land, that is, can reinforce the Tragedy of the Commons. The
reason is that such a quota can, in some cases, reduce the proportion of Kantians
in the population. Such an undesirable composition effect (extensive margin)
- which is absent in a static world with a fixed partition of the population -
can overcome the social benefits from forcing Nash players to buy fewer sheep,
and lead to an even more congestioned common land. This paradoxical result
17The fact that Impure Kantians purchase more animals than Pure Kantians, and the fact
that Nash players internalizing the larger proportion of Kantians react by purchasing more
animals, can counterbalance the fact that Impure Kantians are more numerous than Pure
Kantians, and lead in fine to a larger total number of animals.
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suggests that policy makers, when facing a Tragedy of the Commons, should
be extremely cautious before imposing weak quotas, because in some cases the
cure could make the disease even more severe.
We also compared the impact of a quota on animals with the one of a tax on
animals, and we showed numerically that, although weak quotas can, because
of an extensive margin effect, worsen the Tragedy of the Commons, even a low
tax on animals can reduce the congestion of land. Hence, in a third-best world
where governments face difficulties in imposing strong quotas/taxes, the tax
dominates the quota, by allowing for a reduction of land congestion.
Finally, and still on the policy side, we studied whether a government should,
in the context of the Tragedy of the Commons, promote either Pure or Impure
Kantian morality, by examining the relative fitness of Pure and Impure Kantian
players with respect to Nash players. Here again, thinking for a given partition
is misleading. Whereas, for a given partition, the extent of land congestion is
lower under Pure Kantians than under Impure Kantians, the opposite may be
true once we allow for a varying partition of the population.
All in all, the main contribution of this paper is to show that, in order to
deal with the Tragedy of the Commons, governments should, when designing a
policy intervention, study the consequences while taking into account its effect
on the dynamics of heterogeneity. Ignoring the dynamics of heterogeneity may
lead governments to implement policies that make the Tragedy even worse than
at the laissez-faire, even though such policies would have worked well for a given
partition of the population.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 4
9.1.1 Existence
Note first that:
(
eK∗∗t
)1+σ
=
(
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
) [
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ + G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
(
eN∗∗t
)1+σ
=
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
Hence, from the comparison of those two conditions, and given that the first
part of the first equation is negative, we see that eK∗∗t < e
N∗∗
t .
We know that, from the proof of existence of a q equilibrium, there exists a
unique eN∗∗t for each e
K∗∗
t such that:
eN∗∗t =

(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
Note that eN∗∗t is strictly decreasing in e
K∗∗
t . We also have e
N∗∗
t > 0 when
eK∗∗t = 0.
Let us consider the other expression.
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Hence
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Let us define
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≡ Θ (eN∗∗t , eK∗∗t )
The term in brackets is a weighted sum of the Kantian and the Nash solutions.
Let us derive Θ
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)
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
+
(1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ

1
1+σ−1

−(eK∗∗t qt)(1−qt)
[E∗∗t ]
2
 G′(E∗∗t )−c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ

+
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t

(1−qt)G′′(E∗∗t )ψ(G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t −c
)σ
−
 [G′(E∗∗t )−c]ψσ(G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)1−σ
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
(1−qt)−1[E∗∗t ]


ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ

+(1− qt) qte
K∗∗
t
[E∗∗t ]
2
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ +
 (1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(1−σ)(1−qt)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
[E∗∗t ]
E∗∗t


Let us assume, for the moment, that the second term is negative, and collect
the three other terms.
−(eK∗∗t qt)(1−qt)
[E∗∗t ]
2
 G′(E∗∗t )−c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ
+ (1− qt) qteK∗∗t[E∗∗t ]2
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ
+
(1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(1−σ)(1−qt)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
E∗∗t

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Let us factorize:
(1− qt)eK∗∗t qt
[E∗∗t ]
2
[
− [G′ (E∗∗t )] + G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ +((1− qt)eN∗∗t ) (1− σ) (1− qt)
[E∗∗t ]
2
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
Hence [
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−G′ (E∗∗t )
]
(1− qt)
[
eK∗∗t qt −
(
(1− qt)eN∗∗t
)
(1− σ)]
[E∗∗t ]
2
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
Given eK∗∗t < e
N∗∗
t , we have
eK∗∗t qt − (1− qt)eN∗∗t (1− σ)
< eN∗∗t qt − (1− qt)eN∗∗t (1− σ) = eN∗∗t [σ(1− qt)− 1] < 0
Hence the sum of the three terms in brackets is unambiguously negative.
We thus have:
∂Θ
(
eN∗∗t , e
K∗∗
t
)
∂eN∗∗t
< 0
Next step: derivation wrt eK∗∗t . We have:
∂Θ
(
eN∗∗t , e
K∗∗
t
)
∂eK∗∗t
=
1
1 + σ

(eK∗∗t qt)
E∗∗t
 G′(E∗∗t )−c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ

+
((1−qt)eN∗∗t )
E∗∗t
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ

1
1+σ−1

−(eN∗∗t (1−qt))(qt)
[E∗∗t ]
2
 G′(E∗∗t )−c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ

+
(eK∗∗t qt)
E∗∗t

qtG′′(E∗∗t )ψ(G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t −c
)σ
−
 [G′(E∗∗t )−c]ψσ(G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)1−σ qt
[G′(E∗∗t )]−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
E∗∗t


ψ
(
G([E∗∗t ])
E∗∗t
−c
)σ

+qt
(1−qt)eN∗∗t
[E∗∗t ]
2
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ +
 (1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(1−σ)qt
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
E∗∗t


Assuming, for the moment, that the second term in brackets is negative, let us
recollect the three other terms and carry out the same manipulation as above.
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We have:
−(eN∗∗t qt)(1−qt)
[E∗∗t ]
2
 G′(E∗∗t )−c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ
+ (1−qt)qteN∗∗t
[E∗∗t ]
2
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ
+
(1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(1−σ)qt
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)σ G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
E∗∗t

Let us factorize:
(1− qt)eN∗∗t qt
[E∗∗t ]
2
[
− [G′ (E∗∗t )] + G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ +((1− qt)eN∗∗t ) (1− σ) qt
[E∗∗t ]
2
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
Hence [
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−G′ (E∗∗t )
]
(1− qt)
[
eN∗∗t qt −
(
(1− qt)eN∗∗t
)
(1− σ)]
[E∗∗t ]
2
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
We have
eN∗∗t qt − (1− qt)eN∗∗t (1− σ) = eN∗∗t [qt − (1− qt) (1− σ)] < 0
Hence the sum of the three terms in brackets is unambiguously negative.
We thus have:
∂Θ
(
eN∗∗t , e
K∗∗
t
)
∂eK∗∗t
< 0
Hence, given the two expressions, and given
eK∗∗t =
(eK∗∗t qt)
E∗∗t
 G′ (E∗∗t )− c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
+ (1− qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
≡ Θ (eN∗∗t , eK∗∗t )
We have eK∗∗t being an implicit function of e
N∗∗
t defined such that:
eK∗∗t −Θ
(
eN∗∗t , e
K∗∗
t
)
= 0
We can write:
deK∗∗t
deN∗∗t
= −
−∂Θ(e
N∗∗
t ,e
K∗∗
t )
∂eN∗∗t
1− ∂Θ(e
N∗∗
t ,e
K∗∗
t )
∂eK∗∗t
Hence we have:
deK∗∗t
deN∗∗t
=
∂Θ(eN∗∗t ,e
K∗∗
t )
∂eN∗∗t
1− ∂Θ(e
N∗∗
t ,e
K∗∗
t )
∂eK∗∗t
< 0
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Let us denote by Γ : R+ → R+ the decreasing function defined such that:
eK∗∗t ≡ Γ
(
eN∗∗t
)
with Γ′
(
eN∗∗t
)
< 0.
Let us now take the other expression:
eN∗∗t =

(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
≡ Ξ (eK∗∗t , eN∗∗t )
We have:
∂Ξ
(
eK∗∗t , e
N∗∗
t
)
∂eK∗∗t
< 0
∂Ξ
(
eK∗∗t , e
N∗∗
t
)
∂eN∗∗t
< 0
We have eK∗∗t being an implicit function of e
N∗∗
t defined such that:
eN∗∗t − Ξ
(
eK∗∗t , e
N∗∗
t
)
= 0
We can write:
deK∗∗t
deN∗∗t
= −
1− ∂Ξ(e
K∗∗
t ,e
N∗∗
t )
∂eN∗∗t
−∂Ξ(e
K∗∗
t ,e
N∗∗
t )
∂eK∗∗t
=
1− ∂Ξ(e
K∗∗
t ,e
N∗∗
t )
∂eN∗∗t
∂Ξ(eK∗∗t ,eN∗∗t )
∂eK∗∗t
< 0
Let us denote by Ω : R+ → R+ the decreasing function defined such that:
eK∗∗t ≡ Ω
(
eN∗∗t
)
with Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)
< 0.
In order to discuss the existence of an intersection of the two reaction func-
tions in the
(
eN∗∗t , e
K∗∗
t
)
space, we will compute Γ
(
eN∗∗t
)
and Ω
(
eN∗∗t
)
when
eN∗∗t = e
K∗∗
t , and Γ
(
eN∗∗t
)
and Ω
(
eN∗∗t
)
when eK∗∗t = 0. We have:
eK∗∗t =
qteK∗∗t
E∗∗t
 G′ (E∗∗t )− c
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
+ (1− qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
Given eN∗∗t = e
K∗∗
t , we have:
eˆK∗∗t =
[
qt
(
G′
(
eK∗∗t
)− c)+ (1− qt)(G(eK∗∗t )eK∗∗t − c
)] 1
1+σ
ψ
1
1+σ
(
G(eK∗∗t )
eK∗∗t
− c
) σ
1+σ
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Take the other expression. We have:
e˜K∗∗t =
1
ψ
1
1+σ
(
G(eK∗∗t )
eK∗∗t
− c
) σ
1+σ
[
G
(
eK∗∗t
)
eK∗∗t
− c
] 1
1+σ
We have:
eˆK∗∗t < e˜
K∗∗
t ⇐⇒ Γ
(
eK∗∗t
)
< Ω
(
eK∗∗t
)
We have, at eK∗∗t = 0:
0 =
0 +
(
G((1−qt)eN∗∗t )
(1−qt)eN∗∗t − c
)
ψ
(
G((1−qt)eN∗∗t )
(1−qt)eN∗∗t − c
)σ

1
1+σ
We thus have eˆN∗∗t such that
G
(
(1− qt)eˆN∗∗t
)
(1− qt)eˆN∗∗t
− c = 0
Take the other expression.
eN∗∗t =

(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ

1
1+σ
We have, at eK∗∗t = 0:
eN∗∗t =

(
G((1−qt)eN∗∗t )
(1−qt)eN∗∗t − c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
We thus have e˜N∗∗t such that:
e˜N∗∗t −

(
G((1−qt)e˜N∗∗t )
(1−qt)e˜N∗∗t − c
)1−σ
ψ

1
1+σ
= 0
Let us compare eˆN∗∗t and e˜
N∗∗
t . Let us suppose that e˜
N∗∗
t ≥ eˆN∗∗t . We thus
have
G
(
(1− qt)e˜N∗∗t
)
(1− qt)e˜N∗∗t
− c ≤ G
(
(1− qt)eˆN∗∗t
)
(1− qt)eˆN∗∗t
− c = 0
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A contradiction is reached. We thus have:
e˜N∗∗t < eˆ
N∗∗
t ⇐⇒ Γ (0) > Ω (0)
In sum, given that Γ
(
eK∗∗t
)
< Ω
(
eK∗∗t
)
and Γ (0) > Ω (0), and given that those
functions are continuous and strictly decreasing, we can conclude that the two
reaction functions intersect at least once.
Let us turn back to the intermediate assumptions according to which:
(1− qt)G′′ (E∗∗t )ψ
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)σ
−

[G′(E∗∗t )−c]ψσ(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)1−σ
(1− qt)
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
E∗∗t

 < 0
qtG′′ (E∗∗t )ψ(G (E∗∗t )E∗∗t − c
)σ
−
 [G′ (E∗∗t )− c]ψσ(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)1−σ qtG′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
[E∗∗t ]
E∗∗t

 < 0
By factorization, we only need:G′′ (E∗∗t )ψ(G (E∗∗t )E∗∗t − c
)σ
− [G
′ (E∗∗t )− c]ψσ(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)1−σ [G′ (E∗∗t )]− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
E∗∗t
 < 0
for all eK∗∗t ≤ eN∗∗t . This can be rewritten as:
G′′ (·) < [G′ (E∗∗t )− c]σ
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
G (E∗∗t )− cE∗∗t
This can be rewritten as:
G′′ (E∗∗t )
[G′ (E∗∗t )− c]
[G′(E∗∗t )]−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
G(E∗∗t )−cE∗∗t
> σ
G′′ (E∗∗t )
[G′ (E∗∗t )− c] [G
′(E∗∗t )][E
∗∗
t ]−G(E∗∗t )[
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
]
[E∗∗t ]
2
> σ
G′′ (E∗∗t )
[G′(E∗∗t )−c]
[E∗∗t ]
2
[
G′(E∗∗t )[E
∗∗
t ]−G(E∗∗t )
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
] > σ
Given that
[G′(E∗∗t )−c]
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
< 1, a sufficient condition is:
E∗∗t G
′′ (E∗∗t )[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
] > σ
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Note that, under σ = 0, that condition is always satisfied, implying the
existence of a symmetric q equilibrium with Impure Kantians.
9.1.2 Uniqueness
Let us derive conditions under which the symmetric q equilibrium with Impure
Kantians is unique in the special case where σ = 0. The FOCs are:(
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
+
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c− ψeK∗∗t = 0
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c− ψeN∗∗t = 0
True, we have, from the previous proof, that:
eK∗∗t ≡ Ω
(
eN∗∗t
)
with Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)
< 0 and
eK∗∗t ≡ Γ
(
eN∗∗t
)
with Γ′
(
eN∗∗t
)
< 0.
Existence always holds at σ = 0. Indeed, we have:
Γ (0) > Ω (0)
Γ
(
eK∗∗t
)
< Ω
(
eK∗∗t
)
Uniqueness unfortunately does not follow merely from Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)
< 0 and
Γ′
(
eN∗∗t
)
< 0.
A condition for uniqueness of the equilibrium is that the slope of the Ω (·)
function is higher in absolute value that the slope of the Γ (·) function at any
intersection.
Remind that:
G
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)
qteK∗∗t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
− c− ψeN∗∗t = 0
defines eK∗∗t = Ω
(
eN∗∗t
)
.
We look for Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)
. We have:
Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)
=
deK∗∗t
deN∗∗t
= −
d
[
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c−ψeN∗∗t
]
deN∗∗t
d
[
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c−ψeN∗∗t
]
deK∗∗t
Hence
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Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)
=
deK∗∗t
deN∗∗t
= −
[
G′(E∗∗t )(1−qt)E∗∗t −G(E∗∗t )(1−qt)
(E∗∗t )2
− ψ
]
[
G′(E∗∗t )qtE
∗∗
t −G(E∗∗t )qt
(E∗∗t )
2
]
Hence
Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)
=
deK∗∗t
deN∗∗t
= −
[
(1− qt)
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
E∗∗t
− ψ
]
qt
[
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
E∗∗t
]
Let us now consider the slope of the Γ
(
eN∗∗t
)
:
qte
K∗∗
t
E∗∗t
[G′ (E∗∗t )− c] +
(
(1− qt)eN∗∗t
)
E∗∗t
(
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
− ψeK∗∗t = 0
Hence:
Γ′
(
eN∗∗t
)
=
deK∗∗t
deN∗∗t
= −
d
[
(eK∗∗t qt)
E∗∗t
[G′(E∗∗t )−c]+
((1−qt)eN∗∗t )
E∗∗t
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
−ψeK∗∗t
]
deN∗∗t
d
[
(eK∗∗t qt)
E∗∗t
[G′(E∗∗t )−c]+
((1−qt)eN∗∗t )
E∗∗t
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
−ψeK∗∗t
]
deK∗∗t
Hence:
Γ′
(
eN∗∗t
)
= −

−(eK∗∗t qt)(1−qt)
[E∗∗t ]
2 [G′ (E∗∗t )− c]
+
(eK∗∗t qt)
E∗∗t
G′′ (E∗∗t ) (1− qt)
+
((1−qt))E∗∗t −(1−qt)eN∗∗t (1−qt)
(E∗∗t )2
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
+
((1−qt)eN∗∗t )
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )(1−qt)E∗∗t −G(E∗∗t )(1−qt)
(E∗∗t )
2
)


qtE
∗∗
t −qteK∗∗t qt
(E∗∗t )
2 [G′ (E∗∗t )− c]
+
(eK∗∗t qt)
E∗∗t
[G′′ (E∗∗t ) qt] +
−((1−qt)eN∗∗t )qt
E∗∗2t
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
+
((1−qt)eN∗∗t )
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )qE
∗∗
t −G(E∗∗t )q
E∗∗2t
)
− ψ

Hence
Γ′
(
eN∗∗t
)
= −
 (eK∗∗t qt)E∗∗t G′′ (E∗∗t ) (1− qt)
+
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
(1−qt)
(E∗∗t )2
[−eK∗∗t qt + (1− qt)eN∗∗t ]

[
2(1−q)eN∗∗t qt
(E∗∗t )
2
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
(eK∗∗t qt)
E∗∗t
[G′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψ
]
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We now compare this slope with the slope of Ω′ (·):
Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)
= −
[
(1− qt)
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
− ψE∗∗t
]
qt
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
Γ′
(
eN∗∗t
)
= −
[(
eK∗∗t qt
)
G′′ (E∗∗t ) (1− qt) +
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
(1−qt)
E∗∗t
[−eK∗∗t qt + (1− qt)eN∗∗t ]]
2(1−q)eN∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+ qteK∗∗t [G′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψE∗∗t
Remind that, at the equilibrium, we have: Ω
(
eN∗∗t
)
= Γ
(
eN∗∗t
)
. Uniqueness
is achieved when
∣∣Ω′ (eN∗∗t )∣∣ > ∣∣Γ′ (eN∗∗t )∣∣.
Note that, at q = 0, we have
∣∣Ω′ (eN∗∗t )∣∣ = +∞ > ∣∣Γ′ (eN∗∗t )∣∣, we then have
uniqueness.
When q = 1, we have:
∣∣Ω′ (eN∗∗t )∣∣ = ψE∗∗t[
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
] > ∣∣Γ′ (eN∗∗t )∣∣ = 0.
We thus also have uniqueness.
Is this true for all q > 0?
Let us prove that Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)− Γ′ (eN∗∗t ) < 0.
We have Ω′
(
eN∗∗t
)− Γ′ (eN∗∗t ) equal to:
−
[
(1− qt)
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
− ψE∗∗t
]
qt
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
[(
eK∗∗t qt
)
G′′ (E∗∗t ) (1− qt) +
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
(1−qt)[−eK∗∗t qt+(1−qt)eN∗∗t ]
E∗∗t
]
2(1−q)eN∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+ qteK∗∗t [G′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψE∗∗t
Let us rewrite this with a common denominator:
−
[
(1− qt)
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
− ψE∗∗t
] [ 2(1−q)eN∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+qte
K∗∗
t [G
′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψE∗∗t
]
qt
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
] [
2(1−q)eN∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+ qteK∗∗t [G′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψE∗∗t
]
+
[ (
eK∗∗t qt
)
G′′ (E∗∗t ) (1− qt)
+
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
(1−qt)
E∗∗t
[−eK∗∗t qt + (1− qt)eN∗∗t ]
]
qt
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
[
2(1−q)eN∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+ qteK∗∗t [G′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψE∗∗t
]
qt
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
The denominator is positive. Hence the whole expression is positive if and
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only if:
−
[
(1− qt)
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
− ψE∗∗t
] [ 2(1−q)eN∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+qte
K∗∗
t [G
′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψE∗∗t
]
+

[(
eK∗∗t qt
)
G′′ (E∗∗t ) (1− qt) +
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
(1−qt)[−eK∗∗t qt+(1−qt)eN∗∗t ]
E∗∗t
]
qt
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]

< 0
Let us now factorize and develop:
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
− 2(1−q)2eN∗∗t qtE∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+ ψE∗∗t
2(1−q)eN∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
−(1− qt)qteK∗∗t [G′′ (E∗∗t ) qt] +
(
eK∗∗t qt
)
G′′ (E∗∗t ) qt(1− qt)
+
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
(1−qt)qt
E∗∗t
[−eK∗∗t qt + (1− qt)eN∗∗t ]

+ψE∗∗t
[
qte
K∗∗
t [G
′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψE∗∗t + (1− qt)
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]]
< 0
Hence[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
] [G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t ] (1− qt) qt (− (1−q)eN∗∗t +qteK∗∗tE∗∗t )
+ψE∗∗t
2(1−q)eN∗∗t qt
E∗∗t

+ψE∗∗t
[
qte
K∗∗
t [G
′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψE∗∗t + (1− qt)
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]]
< 0
Hence[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
] [[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
(1− qt) qt (−1) + ψE∗∗t
2(1− q)eN∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
]
+ψE∗∗t
[
qte
K∗∗
t [G
′′ (E∗∗t ) qt]− ψE∗∗t + (1− qt)
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]]
< 0
The first term is negative. The second one is also negative.
Hence we always have, for any qt , that Ω
′ (eN∗∗t ) − Γ′ (eN∗∗t ) < 0 so that∣∣Ω′ (eN∗∗t )∣∣− ∣∣Γ′ (eN∗∗t )∣∣ > 0. We thus have the uniqueness of the q equilibrium
with Impure Kantians.
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9.2 Proof of Proposition 5
The dynamics of qt is given by:
qt+1 = qt+qt(1−qt)

(1−qt)
κ
[
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ(eK∗t )22 − [G (eN∗t )− ceN∗t − ψ(eN∗t )22 ]]
− qtκ
 e
N
t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceN∗t −
ψ(eN∗t )
2
2
−
[
eK∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2
]


Obviously, there exist two stationary equilibria with homogeneous popula-
tions: q = 0 and q = 1.
Regarding the existence of an intermediate stationary equilibrium, let us
first notice that, at such an intermediate equilibrium, we have:
(1− qt)
κ
[
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ (eK∗t )22 −
[
G
(
eN∗t
)− ceN∗t − ψ (eN∗t )22
]]
=
qt
κ
[
eNt G (E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceN∗t −
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
−
[
eK∗t G (E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
]]
In other words, socialization efforts are equal for the two types. Some simplifi-
cations yield:
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ (eK∗t )22 −G (eN∗t )+ ceN∗t + ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
−qtG
(
eK∗t
)
+ qtce
K∗
t + qt
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
+ qtG
(
eN∗t
)− qtceN∗t − qtψ (eN∗t )22
=
qte
N∗
t G (E
∗
t )
E∗t
− qtceN∗t −
qtψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
− qte
K∗
t G (E
∗
t )
E∗t
+ qtce
K∗
t + qt
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
Hence[
G
(
eK∗t
)−G (eN∗t )] (1− qt)[
eNt − eK∗t
] +c+ ψ [eN∗t + eK∗t ]
2
=
qtG
(
qte
K∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗t
)
qteK∗t + (1− qt)eN∗t
Let us now substitute for optimal animal levels. Under σ = 0, we have:
eK∗t =
(
G′
(
eK∗t
)− c)
ψ
eN∗t =
(
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c
)
ψ
Hence [
G
(
eK∗t
)−G (eN∗t )] (1− qt)
ψ
[
eN∗t − eK∗t
] + [eN∗t + eK∗t ]
2
=
qt
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c
ψ
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Remind that eK∗t does not depend on qt, and can thus be treated as a param-
eter. Thus we have two equations with two unknowns. Whether a stationary
equilibrium exists or not depends on whether there exists some pair
(
qt, e
N∗
t
)
satisfying the equations:
eN∗t =
(
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c
)
ψ[
G
(
eK∗t
)−G (eN∗t )] (1− qt)
ψ
[
eN∗t − eK∗t
] + [eN∗t + eK∗t ]
2
=
qt
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c
ψ
From the first equation, we know that eN∗t is an implicit function of qt:
eN∗t −
(
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c
)
ψ
= 0
We use the implicit function theorem to obtain the derivative of eN∗t wrt qt:
deN∗t
dqt
= −
−G
′(E∗t )[e
K∗
t −eN∗t ]E∗t−G(E∗t )[eK∗t −eN∗t ]
ψ[E∗t ]
2
1− G′(E∗t )(1−qt)E∗t−G(E∗t )(1−qt)
ψ[E∗t ]
2
Further simplifications yield:
deN∗t
dqt
=
− [eN∗t − eK∗t ] G′(E∗t )−G(E∗t )E∗tψ[E∗t ]
1− (1− qt)
G′(E∗t )−
G(E∗t )
[E∗t ]
ψ[E∗t ]
Note that, because of the concavity of G (·), we know that G
′(E∗t )−
G(E∗t )
E∗t
ψ[E∗t ]
< 0.
Moreover, given that eN∗t > e
K∗
t , we know that the numerator is positive. Fur-
thermore, we also know that the denominator is also positive. Hence, without
ambiguity, we obtain:
deN∗t
dqt
> 0
The more numerous the Pure Kantians are, and the more animals Nash players
purchase. We thus have the following function:
eNt ≡ e (qt)
with e′ (qt) > 0.
Let us now take the other equation, and substitute for e (qt).
[
G
(
eK∗t
)−G (e (qt))] (1− qt)
ψ
[
e (qt)− eK∗t
] + [e (qt) + eK∗t ]
2
−
qt
G(qteK∗t +(1−qt)e(qt))
qteK∗t +(1−qt)e(qt) − c
ψ
= 0
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Let us now consider the case where qt = 0. We know, from the equations for
optimal socialization efforts, that:
τNt = 0
τKt =
1
κ
[
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ (eK∗t )22 −
[
G (e (0))− ce (0)− ψ (e (0))
2
2
]]
Pure Kantians behave like a social planner, and chooses the number of animals
that, generalized to all players, will bring the highest individual utility. On the
contrary, when q = 0, Nash players all chose the same number of animals, but
suffer from a coordination failure. As a consequence, they tend to have too
many animals. As a consequence, the utility of each Nash player when there is
no Pure Kantian player is necessarily inferior to the utility obtained by Pure
Kantians. This explains why, at q = 0, the socialization effort chosen by Pure
Kantians is higher than the one chosen by Nash players. Hence the term in
brackets
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ (eK∗t )22 −
[
G (e (0))− ce (0)− ψ (e (0))
2
2
]
> 0
Therefore τKt (0) > 0. Hence, Pure Kantians survive when they are in ultra
minority. The survival of Pure Kantians when q = 0 is due to two things. First,
the standard cultural substitution effect: when q = 0, Nash parents rely on the
society for the transmission of their trait, so that τNt = 0. Second, the effort
chosen by Pure Kantians parents is strictly positive τKt > 0.
Let us now consider the case where qt = 1. The socialization effort for the
Kantian is now:
τKt = 0
The Pure Kantian does not invest any effort in socialization, because he relies
entirely on the rest of the society. This is again the standard cultural substitu-
tion effect.
Regarding the socialization investment of the Nash player, note that, for any
qt, his socialization effort is:
τNt =
qt
κ
[
eN∗t
E∗t
G (E∗t )− ceN∗t −
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
−
[
eK∗t
E∗t
G (E∗t )− ceK∗t −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
]]
Since eNt maximizes, by definition, the function U (x) ≡ xG(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− cx − ψ(x)22
for any level of eK∗t and qt, we have, for any e
K∗
t 6= eN∗t , that the first term in
brackets exceeds strictly the second term in brackets. Hence we have:
τNt > 0
To be sure, we can rewrite the socialization effort of the Nash parent as:
τNt =
qt
κ
[(
eN∗t − eK∗t
)(G (E∗t )
E∗t
− c
)
+
ψ
2
[(
eK∗t
)2 − (eN∗t )2]]
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Let us now substitute for
eN∗t =
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c
ψ
this yields:
τNt =
qt
κ
[
ψ
2
(
eN∗t − eK∗t
)2]
> 0
Thus Nash parents always invest a positive effort in socialization when qt > 0.
In the case where qt → 1, we have:
τNt =
1
κ
[
ψ
2
(
eN∗t − eK∗t
)2]
Given that
τKt − τNt > 0 when qt = 0
τKt − τNt < 0 when qt = 1
we know, by continuity, that there exists at least one level of qt ∈ ]0, 1[ such
that τKt − τNt = 0, that is, at least one intermediate stationary equilibrium.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 6
The dynamic equation for qt is:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)

(1−qt)
κ
 G (eK∗t )− ceK∗t − ψ(e
K∗
t )
2
2
−
[
G
(
eN∗t
)− ceN∗t − ψ(eN∗t )22 ]

− qtκ
 e
N∗
t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceN∗t −
ψ(eN∗t )
2
2
−
[
eK∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2
]


Regarding the uniqueness of the intermediate stationary equilibrium, it should
be stressed that a necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of an
intermediate stationary equilibrium is that the derivative of the term in brack-
ets is negative at any intermediate stationary equilibrium. Indeed, if it were
positive, then there would be at least 3 intermediate equilibria.
Let us thus differentiate the bracket (equal to τKt − τNt ) with respect to qt.
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This yields:
−1
κ
[
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ(eK∗t )22 − [G (eN∗t )− ceN∗t − ψ(eN∗t )22 ]]
+ (1−qt)κ
[
−deN∗tdqt
[
G′
(
eN∗t
)− c− ψ (eN∗t )]]
− 1κ
[
eN∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceN∗t −
ψ(eN∗t )
2
2 −
[
eK∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2
]]
− qtκ

 deN∗tdqt G (E∗t )
+eN∗t G
′ (E∗t )
(
eK∗t − eN∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗
t
dqt
)  (E∗t )
−eN∗t G (E∗t )
(
eK∗t − eN∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗
t
dqt
)
[E∗t ]
2
−cdeN∗tdqt − ψ
(
eN∗t
) deN∗t
dqt
−

 e
K∗
t G
′ (E∗t )
(
eK∗t − eN∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗
t
dqt
)
(E∗t )
−
(
eK∗t − eN∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗
t
dqt
)
eK∗t G (E
∗
t )

[E∗t ]
2


A necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the intermediate
stationary equilibrium is that this derivative is negative at the intermediate
stationary equilibrium.
Remind that, at the intermediate stationary equilibrium, socialization efforts
are equal. Hence we have:
(1−qt)
κ
[
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ(eK∗t )22 − [G (eNt )− ceNt − ψ(eNt )22 ]]
= qtκ
[
eNt G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceNt −
ψ(eNt )
2
2 −
[
eK∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2
]]
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Hence, the previous expression can be simplified to:[
−1
κq
] [
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ(eK∗t )22 − [G (eN∗t )− ceN∗t − ψ(eN∗t )22 ]]
+ (1−qt)κ
[
−deN∗tdqt
[
G′
(
eN∗t
)− c− ψ (eN∗t )]]
− qtκ

 deN∗tdqt G (E∗t )
+eN∗t G
′ (E∗t )
(
eK∗t − eN∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗
t
dqt
)  (E∗t )
−eN∗t G (E∗t )
(
eK∗t − eN∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗
t
dqt
)
[E∗t ]
2
−

 e
K∗
t G
′ (E∗t )
(
eK∗t − eN∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗
t
dqt
)
(E∗t )
−
(
eK∗t − eN∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗
t
dqt
)
eK∗t G (E
∗
t )

[E∗t ]
2

−cdeN∗tdqt − ψ
(
eN∗t
) deN∗t
dqt

The first term, which is negative, captures the effect of cultural substitution
on the socialization effort of both players. It reduces the effort of Pure Kantian
and it raises the effort of Nash. The second term captures the impact of q on
the relative utility gain to have a Pure Kantian child for Pure Kantians. That
second term if positive. The third term captures the impact of q on the relative
utility gain of having a Nash child for Nash parents. The sign of that third term
is ambiguous, but we can decompose and simplify that third term to see the
opposite effects at work.
We know that a rise in q will necessarily increase ∆V K , but its impact on
∆V N is ambiguous. The ambiguity comes from the fact that the change in eN∗
(i.e. a rise when q rises) affects both the utility of having a Pure Kantian child
and of having a Nash child. Two effects are at work.
To isolate the effect of a rise in q for a given eN∗, let us set de
N∗
t
dqt
= 0 in
the third term. We then obtain that, if eN∗ was given, the rise in q would raise
∆V N = V NN − V NK :− [eN∗t − eK∗t ]2 [G′ (E∗t )]− G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
E∗t
 > 0
Thus Nash parents gain more than Pure Kantian parents when q is raised
for a given eN∗. Indeed, a higher proportion of Kantians implies more space per
animal for all, but as Nash players have more animals, this is more beneficial
for them.
The second effect arises when q is given but Nash players adapt the number
of animals eN∗. To isolate that effect, let us now delete all terms of the third
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term that are not in
deN∗t
dqt
. We then obtain:
qt
κ
deN∗t
dqt
G (E∗t )
E∗t
− c− ψeN∗t +
(
eN∗t − eK∗t
)
(1− qt)
G′ (E∗t )− G(E
∗
t )
(E∗t )
E∗t

Using the FOC for Nash players:
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c− ψeN∗t = 0, we have:
qt
κ
deN∗t
dqt
(eN∗t − eK∗t ) (1− qt)G′ (E∗t )− G(E
∗
t )
(E∗t )
E∗t
 < 0
Hence, when Nash players increase the number of animals, both Pure Kan-
tians and Nash players have a decrease in utility, but the latter seem to lose
more. Why? Again, the rise in eN∗t reduces the availability of space, and thus
reduces the return on each animal. But as Nash players have more animals,
they suffer from a larger utility loss.
Using that decomposition for the third term, we obtain the following condi-
tion for uniqueness of the intermediate stationary equilibrium:[ −1
κq∗
] [
G
(
eK∗
)− ceK∗ − ψ (eK∗)2
2
−
[
G
(
eN∗
)− ceN∗ − ψ (eN∗)2
2
]]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
(1− q∗)
κ
[
−de
N∗
dq∗
[
G′
(
eN∗
)− c− ψ (eN∗)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
−q
∗
κ
[
− [eN∗ − eK∗]2 G′ (E∗)− G(E∗)E∗
E∗
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
−q
∗
κ
deN∗
dq∗
[(
eN∗ − eK∗) (1− q∗)G′ (E∗)− G(E∗)E∗
E∗
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0
9.4 Proof of Proposition 7
The dynamic equation is:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)

(1−qt)
κ
 G (eK∗t )− ceK∗t − ψ(e
K∗
t )
2
2
−
[
G
(
eN∗t
)− ceN∗t − ψ(eN∗t )22 ]

− qtκ
 e
N∗
t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceN∗t −
ψ(eN∗t )
2
2
−
[
eK∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2
]


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Differentiating this with respect to qt yields:
1 + (1− 2qt)

(1−qt)
κ
 G (eK∗t )− ceK∗t − ψ(e
K∗
t )
2
2
−
[
G
(
eN∗t
)− ceN∗t − ψ(eN∗t )22 ]

− qtκ
[
eN∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceN∗t −
ψ(eN∗t )
2
2 −
[
eK∗t G(E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ(eK∗t )
2
2
]]

+qt(1− qt)

[
−1
κq
] [
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ(eK∗t )22 − [G (eN∗t )− ceN∗t − ψ(eN∗t )22 ]]
+ (1−q)κ
[
−deN∗tdq
[
G′
(
eN∗t
)− c− ψ (eN∗t )]]
− qκ
[
− [eN∗t − eK∗t ]2 G′(E∗t )−G(E∗t )E∗tE∗t
]
− qκ de
N∗
t
dq
[(
eN∗t − eK∗t
)
(1− q)
G′(E∗t )−
G(E∗t )
(E∗t )
E∗t
]

When q = 0, the derivative is:
1 +
1
κ
[
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ (eK∗t )22 −
[
G
(
eNt
)− ceNt − ψ (eNt )22
]]
> 1
Hence the equilibrium q = 0 is unstable.
Take now the equilibrium q = 1. The derivative is:
1 +
1
κ
[
eN∗t G (E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceN∗t −
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
−
[
eK∗t G (E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
]]
= 1 +
1
κ
[
eN∗t
[
G (E∗t )
E∗t
− c− ψe
N∗
t
2
]
−
[
eK∗t G (E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
]]
63
Using the FOC for Nash players:
G(E∗t )
E∗t
− c− ψeN∗t = 0, we have:
1 +
1
κ
[
eN∗t
ψeN∗t
2
−
[
eK∗t G (E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
]]
= 1 +
1
κ
[
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
−
[
eK∗t G (E
∗
t )
E∗t
− ceK∗t −
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
]]
= 1 +
1
κ
[
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
− eK∗t
[
G (E∗t )
E∗t
− c− ψe
K∗
t
2
]]
= 1 +
1
κ
[
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
− eK∗t
[
ψeN∗t −
ψeK∗t
2
]]
= 1 +
1
κ
[
ψ
(
eN∗t
)2
2
+
ψ
(
eK∗t
)2
2
− ψeN∗t eK∗t
]
= 1 +
1
κ
ψ
2
[(
eN∗t − eK∗t
)2]
> 1
Hence the equilibrium q = 1 is also unstable.
Finally, at the intermediate equilibrium, the derivative is:
1+q(1−q)

[
−1
κq
] [
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ(eK∗t )22 − [G (eN∗t )− ceN∗t − ψ(eN∗t )22 ]]
+ (1−q)κ
[
−deN∗tdq
[
G′
(
eN∗t
)− c− ψ (eN∗t )]]
− qκ
[
− [eN∗t − eK∗t ]2 G′(E∗t )−G(E∗t )E∗tE∗t
]
− qκ de
N∗
t
dq
[(
eN∗t − eK∗t
)
(1− q)
G′(E∗t )−
G(E∗t )
(E∗t )
E∗t
]

Local stability requires that expression to be less than 1 in absolute value.
Note that, when the intermediate stationary equilibrium is unique, the factor
in brackets is negative (by Proposition 6), and so the stability condition is
necessarily satisfied.
In the case where the intermediate stationary equilibrium is unique, we know
that, by the continuity of F (qt), the basin of attraction of the intermediate
stationary equilibrium is equal to [0, 1], implying that the equilibrium is globally
stable.
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9.5 Proofs of Propositions 8, 9 and 10
9.5.1 Toolbox
Let us first compute the derivatives of each term V KK , V KN , V NK and V NN .
V KK =
eK∗∗t G (E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)2
2
V KN = G
(
eN∗∗t
)− ceN∗∗t − ψ (eN∗∗t )22
V NK =
eK∗∗t G (E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)2
2
V NN =
eN∗∗t G (E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ
(
eN∗∗t
)2
2
where
E∗∗t ≡ E (qt) = qteK∗∗t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
with derivatives
dE (qt)
dqt
= eK∗∗t + qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
− eN∗∗t + (1− qt)
deN∗∗t
dqt
d2E (qt)
dq2t
=
deK∗∗t
dqt
+
deK∗∗t
dqt
+ qt
deK∗∗2t
dq2t
− de
N∗∗
t
dqt
− de
N∗∗
t
dqt
+ (1− qt)d
2eN∗∗t
dq2t
The derivatives of V KK , V KN , V NK and V NN are:
dV KK
dqt
=
deK∗∗t
dqt
(
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c− ψeK∗∗t
)
+
dE (qt)
dqt
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
Hence
dV KK
dqt
=
deK∗∗t
dqt
(
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c− ψeK∗∗t + qt
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
+
(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)
deN∗∗t
dqt
)
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
Using the Envelope Theorem, we know that the term in brackets is equal to
zero (it is the FOC of the Impure Kantians).
Hence:
dV KK
dqt
=
(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)
deN∗∗t
dqt
)
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
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Hence, at q = 0, we have:
dV KK
dqt
=
(
deN∗∗t
dqt
)(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
Let us now compute the second-order derivative:
d2V KK
dq2t
=
d2eK∗∗t
dq2t
(
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c− ψeK∗∗t + qt
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
+
deK∗∗t
dqt

dE(qt)
dqt
1
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
− ψ deK∗∗tdqt
+
(
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
+ qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
E∗∗t −eK∗∗t dE(qt)dqt
E∗∗2t
)(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
+qt
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
dE(qt)
dqt
(
G′′ (E∗∗t )− 1E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
))

+
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
− de
N∗∗
t
dqt
− de
N∗∗
t
dqt
+ (1− qt)d
2eN∗∗t
dq2t
)[
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)]
+
(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)
deN∗∗t
dqt
) de
K∗∗
t
dqt
E∗∗t −eK∗∗t dE(qt)dqt
E∗∗2t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
+
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′′ (E∗∗t )− 1E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
))

Using, again, the Envelope Theorem, we have:
d2V KK
dq2t
=
deK∗∗t
dqt

dE(qt)
dqt
1
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
− ψ deK∗∗tdqt
+
(
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
+ qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
E∗∗t −eK∗∗t dE(qt)dqt
E∗∗2t
)(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
+qt
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
dE(qt)
dqt
(
G′′ (E∗∗t )− 1E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
))

+
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
− de
N∗∗
t
dqt
− de
N∗∗
t
dqt
+ (1− qt)d
2eN∗∗t
dq2t
)[
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)]
+
(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)
deN∗∗t
dqt
) de
K∗∗
t
dqt
E∗∗t −eK∗∗t dE(qt)dqt
E∗∗2t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
+
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′′ (E∗∗t )− 1E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
))

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Hence
d2V KK
dq2t
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]

deK∗∗t
dqt
dE(qt)
dqt
1
E∗∗t
+
deK∗∗t
dqt
(
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
+ qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
E∗∗t −eK∗∗t dE(qt)dqt
E∗∗2t
)
+
deK∗∗t
dqt
qt
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
dE(qt)
dqt
1
E∗∗t
+
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
− deN∗∗tdqt −
deN∗∗t
dqt
+ (1− qt)d
2eN∗∗t
dq2t
)
+

(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗∗
t
dqt
)(
deK∗∗t
dqt
E∗∗t −eK∗∗t dE(qt)dqt
(E∗∗t )
2 +
eK∗∗t
(E∗∗t )
2
) 

+
deK∗∗t
dqt
(
−ψde
K∗∗
t
dqt
+ qt
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
dE (qt)
dqt
(G′′ (E∗∗t ))
)
+
(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)
deN∗∗t
dqt
)[
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(G′′ (E∗∗t ))
]
Note that q = 0, this simplifies to:
d2V KK
dq2t
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]

deK∗∗t
dqt
dE(qt)
dqt
1
E∗∗t
+
deK∗∗t
dqt
(
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
)
+
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
− 2deN∗∗tdqt +
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
)
+
deN∗∗t
dqt
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
E∗∗t −eK∗∗t dE(qt)dqt
E∗∗2t
+
eK∗∗t
(E∗∗t )
2
)

−ψ
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
)2
+
deN∗∗t
dqt
[
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
G′′ (E∗∗t )
]
Let us now compute
deN∗∗t
dqt
:
eN∗∗t −
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
= 0
Note that, at the equilibrium, both eK∗∗t and e
N∗∗
t are functions of qt only. In
other words, for each level of qt, we know from Proposition 4 that there exist
only one unique vector
(
eK∗∗t , e
N∗∗
t
)
.
We have:(
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
+
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c− ψeK∗∗t = 0
Thus, using the Theorem of implicit function, we have:
deK∗∗t
dqt
= −
d
[(
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)[
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
+
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c−ψeK∗∗t
]
dqt
d
[(
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)[
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
+
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c−ψeK∗∗t
]
deK∗∗t
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Hence the numerator is:(
eK∗∗t E
∗∗
t −eK∗∗t qt
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
E∗∗2t
)[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
(
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)[
G′′ (E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
−
G′(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
E∗∗t −G(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
E∗∗2t
]
+
G′(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
E∗∗t −G(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
E∗∗2t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
](
eK∗∗t E
∗∗
t
E∗∗2t
)
+
(
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)
G′′ (E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
+
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
1
E∗∗2t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
] [
E∗∗t − 2eK∗∗t qt
]
Hence
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
(
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
G′′ (E∗∗t )
+
(
(1−qt)eN∗∗t −eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
The denominator is:
qt
(
(1− qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗2t
)[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
+
eK∗∗t qtqt
E∗∗t
[
G′′ (E∗∗t )−
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)]
+
qt
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
− ψ
Hence
qt
(
2(1− qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗2t
)[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
+
eK∗∗t qtqt
E∗∗t
[G′′ (E∗∗t )]− ψ
Hence we have:
deK∗∗t
dqt
= −
 (e
K∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
(
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
G′′ (E∗∗t )
+
(
(1−qt)eN∗∗t −eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)

qt
(
2(1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗2t
) [
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
eK∗∗t qtqt
E∗∗t
[G′′ (E∗∗t )]− ψ
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Let us now substitute for
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eK∗∗t =cst
= eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗∗
t
dqt
:
deK∗∗t
dqt
= −
 eK∗∗tE∗∗t [G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t ]+ ( eK∗∗t qtE∗∗t )(eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)deN∗∗tdqt )G′′ (E∗∗t )
+
(
(1−qt)eN∗∗t −eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗∗
t
dqt
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
) 
qt
(
2(1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗2t
) [
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
eK∗∗t qtqt
E∗∗t
[G′′ (E∗∗t )]− ψ
Hence
deK∗∗t
dqt
= −
 eK∗∗tE∗∗t [G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t ]+ ( eK∗∗t qtE∗∗t )(eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)deN∗∗tdqt )G′′ (E∗∗t )
+
(
(1−qt)eN∗∗t −eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗∗
t
dqt
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
) 
qt
(
2(1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗2t
) [
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
eK∗∗t qtqt
E∗∗t
[G′′ (E∗∗t )]− ψ
Hence, at q = 0, we have:
deK∗∗t
dqt
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
] [1 + (deN∗∗tdqt ) 1E∗∗t ]
ψ
Let us now compute
deN∗∗t
dqt
. We have:
eN∗∗t −
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
= 0
Hence
deN∗∗t
dqt
= −
d
eN∗∗t −
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
ψ

dqt
d
eN∗∗t −
(
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
−c
)
ψ

deN∗∗t
Hence
deN∗∗t
dqt
= −
−
(
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eN∗∗t =cst
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ

[
1−
(
(1−qt) 1E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]
Hence, replacing by
dE∗∗t
dqt
∣∣∣
eN∗∗t =cst
=
(
eK∗∗t + qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
− eN∗∗t
)
:
deN∗∗t
dqt
= −
−
((
eK∗∗t +qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
−eN∗∗t
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ

[
1−
(
(1−qt) 1E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]
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At q = 0, we have eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t = 0 and:
deN∗∗t
dqt
= 0
Hence, noting that:
deK∗∗t
dqt
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
] [1 + (deN∗∗tdqt ) 1E∗∗t ]
ψ
We have:
deK∗∗t
dqt
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
ψ
Let us now compute the second-order derivative:
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
= −


− 1ψ

(
deK∗∗t
dq +
deK∗∗t
dqt
+ qt
d2eK∗∗t
dq2t
− deN∗∗tdqt
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
+

(
eK∗∗t + qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
− eN∗∗t
)

(
G′′ (E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dq −
G′(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dq E
∗∗
t −G(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dq
E∗∗2t
)
E∗∗t
−
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
dE∗∗t
dq

E∗∗2t



[
1−
(
(1−qt) 1E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]

−

−
((
eK∗∗t +qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
−eN∗∗t
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ

− 1ψ

(
− 1E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
))
+

(1− qt)

(
G′′ (E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dq −
G′(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dq E
∗∗
t −G(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dq
E∗∗2t
)
E∗∗t
−
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
dE∗∗t
dq

E∗∗2t




[
1−
(
(1−qt) 1E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]2
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Hence, at q = 0 :
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
= −

[
− 1ψ
((
deK∗∗t
dq +
deK∗∗t
dqt
− deN∗∗tdqt
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
))][
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
] 
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]2
Hence
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
=
1
ψ
(
2
deK∗∗t
dq
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
))
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]
Hence, given
deK∗∗t
dq =
[
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
ψ at q = 0:
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
=
2 1E∗∗t
[(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψ
]2
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]
Hence, in the general case where q 6= 0, we now have a system with two
equations and two unknowns:
deN∗∗t
dqt
=
−
−
((
eK∗∗t +qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
−eN∗∗t
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ

[
1−
(
(1−qt) 1E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]

deK∗∗t
dqt
= −
 eK∗∗tE∗∗t [G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t ]+ ( eK∗∗t qtE∗∗t )(eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)deN∗∗tdqt )G′′ (E∗∗t )
+
(
(1−qt)eN∗∗t −eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗∗
t
dqt
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
) 
qt
(
2(1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗2t
) [
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
eK∗∗t qtqt
E∗∗t
[G′′ (E∗∗t )]− ψ
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Substituting the first equation in the second one, we obtain:
deK∗∗t
dqt
= −

eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t −

(1−qt)
−
(
eK∗∗t +qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
−eN∗∗t
)(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψE∗∗t

1− (1−qt)
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψE∗∗t


G′′ (E∗∗t )
+

(
(1−qt)eN∗∗t −eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t −

(1−qt)
−
(
eK∗∗t +qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
−eN∗∗t
)(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψE∗∗t

1− (1−qt)
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψE∗∗t





qt
(
2(1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗2t
) [
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
eK∗∗t qtqt
E∗∗t
[G′′ (E∗∗t )]− ψ
This expression will be used later on.
Let us now compute the other derivatives.
V KN = G
(
eN∗∗t
)− ceN∗∗t − ψ (eN∗∗t )22
Let us first compute the first derivative wrt qt:
dV KN
dqt
= G′
(
eN∗∗t
) deN∗∗t
dqt
− cde
N∗∗
t
dqt
− ψeN∗∗t
deN∗∗t
dqt
=
deN∗∗t
dqt
[
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− c− ψeN∗∗t ]
The second-order derivative is:
d2V KN
dq2t
=
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
[
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− c− ψeN∗∗t ]+ deN∗∗tdqt
[
G′′
(
eN∗∗t
) deN∗∗t
dqt
− ψde
N∗∗
t
dqt
]
=
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
[
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− c− ψeN∗∗t ]+ (deN∗∗tdqt
)2 [
G′′
(
eN∗∗t
)− ψ]
Let us now compute the last derivative. We have:
V NN =
eN∗∗t G (E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ
(
eN∗∗t
)2
2
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Hence
dV NN
dqt
=
[
deN∗∗t
dqt
G (E∗∗t ) + e
N∗∗
t G
′ (E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dqt
]
E∗∗t − eN∗∗t G (E∗∗t ) dE
∗∗
t
dqt
E∗∗2t
− cde
N∗∗
t
dqt
− ψeN∗∗t
deN∗∗t
dqt
=
deN∗∗t
dqt
[
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
− c− ψeN∗∗t
]
+
eN∗∗t G
′ (E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dqt
E∗∗t − eN∗∗t G (E∗∗t ) dE
∗∗
t
dqt
E∗∗2t
= 0 +
dE∗∗t
dqt
eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
Hence
dV NN
dqt
=
(
eK∗∗t + qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
− eN∗∗t + (1− qt)
deN∗∗t
dqt
)
eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
Let us now compute d∆V
N
dqt
:
d∆V N
dqt
=

[
deNt
dqt
G(E∗∗t )+e
N
t G
′(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dq
]
E∗∗t −(eNt G(E∗∗t ))
dE∗∗t
dq
[E∗∗t ]
2 − cde
N
t
dqt
− ψeNt de
N
t
dqt
−
[
deK∗∗t
dqt
G(E∗∗t )+e
K∗∗
t G
′(E∗∗t )
dE∗∗t
dq
]
E∗∗t −(eK∗∗t G(E∗∗t ))
dE∗∗t
dq
[E∗∗t ]
2 − cde
K∗∗
t
dqt
− ψeK∗∗t de
K∗∗
t
dqt

Further simplifications yield, at q = 0:
d∆V N
dqt
=

[
deN∗∗t
dqt
G(E∗∗t )
]
E∗∗t
− cdeN∗∗tdqt − ψ
deN∗∗t
dqt
−
[ deK∗∗tdqt G(eN∗∗t )]
eN∗∗t
− cdeK∗∗tdqt − ψeK∗∗t
deK∗∗t
dqt


Hence, given the FOCs for Nash players, we have:
d∆V N
dqt
= 0
9.5.2 Existence and stability of homogeneous stationary equilibria
The equation for the dynamics of qt is now:
qt+1 ≡ H (qt) = qt+qt(1−qt)

(1−qt)
κ
 e
K∗∗
t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
−
[
G
(
eN∗∗t
)− ceN∗∗t − ψ(eN∗∗t )22 ]

− qtκ
 e
N∗∗
t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
−
[
eK∗∗t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
]


Let us first study the existence of a stationary equilibrium.
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Obviously, q = 0 and q = 1 are stationary equilibria.
Let us now consider the stability of those homogeneous equilibria.
At qt = 1, we know that
τKt = 0
τNt =
1
κ
 e
N∗∗
t
eK∗t
G
(
eK∗∗t
)− ceN∗∗t − ψ(eN∗∗t )22
−
[
eK∗∗t
eK∗∗t
G
(
eK∗∗t
)− ceK∗∗t − ψ(eK∗t )22 ]

But remind that, when q = 1, eK∗∗t = e
K∗
t . Hence,
τNt =
1
κ
[
eN∗∗t
eK∗t
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceN∗∗t − ψ (eN∗∗t )22 −
[
G
(
eK∗t
)− ceK∗t − ψ (eK∗t )22
]]
> 0
Hence,
H ′ (qt) = 1 + (1− 2qt)

(1−qt)
κ
 e
K∗∗
t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
−
[
eN∗∗t G(e
N∗∗
t )
eN∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
]

− qtκ
 e
N∗∗
t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
−
[
eK∗t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
]


+qt(1− qt)
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
Hence
H ′ (qt) = 1− 1

(1−qt)
κ
 e
K∗∗
t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
−
[
eN∗∗t G(e
N∗∗
t )
eN∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
]

− qtκ
 e
N∗∗
t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
−
[
eK∗t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
]


= 1− 1 [0− τNt ] > 1
hence q = 1 is unstable.
Let us now consider the stability of q = 0. The derivative of H (qt) at qt = 0
is:
H ′ (qt) = 1 + (1− 2qt)
[
τKt − τNt
]
+qt(1− qt)
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
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Remind that, at q = 0, we have:
eK∗∗t =
G(eN∗∗t )
eN∗∗t
− c
ψ
= eN∗∗t
Hence we have:
τKt =
1
κ
[
eN∗∗t G
(
eN∗∗t
)
eN∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ
(
eN∗∗t
)2
2
−
[
G
(
eN∗∗t
)− ceN∗∗t − ψ (eN∗∗t )22
]]
= 0
Thus Impure Kantian parents invest 0 in socialization when qt = 0. The
reason is simple: when qt = 0, Impure Kantians behave exactly as Nash players,
and thus, from the perspective of parents, there is no difference between having
a Nash player and an Impure Kantian.
Moreover, at q = 0, we have:
τNt =
0
κ
 e
N∗∗
t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ(eN∗∗t )
2
2
−
[
eK∗∗t G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ(eK∗∗t )
2
2
]
 = 0
Thus both socialization efforts are 0.
At qt = 0 we have:
H ′ (0) = 1
Second-order derivative is:
H ′′ (qt) = −2
[
τKt − τNt
]
+ 2(1− 2qt)
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
+ qt(1− qt)
d2
[
τKt − τNt
]
dq2t
At qt = 0 we have:
H ′′ (qt) = 2
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
which is to be computed.
From the toolbox, we have, at q = 0:
dV KK
dq
− dV
KN
dq
= 0
Back to the initial expression, and reminding that at q = 0 we have ∆V K =
∆V N = 0, it follows that
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
= −∆V K + (1− q)d∆V
K
dqt
−
[
∆V N + q
d∆V N
dqt
]
= 0 +
d∆V K
dqt
−
[
0 + 0
d∆V N
dqt
]
=
d∆V K
dqt
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Let us compute d∆V
K
dqt
= dV
KK
dq − dV
KN
dq .
From the toolbox, we have, at q = 0:
dV KN
dq
=
deNt
dqt
[
G′
(
eNt
)− c− ψeNt ]
dV KK
dqt
=
(
deNt
dqt
)(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
Noting, that, from the toolbox, we have
deNt
dqt
= 0.
Hence we have:
d∆V K
dqt
=
dV KK
dq
− dV
KN
dq
= 0
Hence
H ′′ (0) = 0
Hence, following Dannan, Elaydi and Ponomarenko (2003, Theorem 2.3),
we know that only two cases are possible: either H ′′′ (qt) at the fixed point
is strictly negative, implying that the equilibrium is asymptotically stable, or
H ′′′ (qt) > 0 at the fixed point is strictly positive, implying that the equilibrium
is unstable.
Computing the third order derivative, we obtain:
H ′′′ (qt) = −2
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
+ 2(1− 2qt)
d2
[
τKt − τNt
]
dq2t
− 4d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
+(1− 2qt)
d2
[
τKt − τNt
]
dq2t
+ qt(1− qt)
d3
[
τKt − τNt
]
dq3t
At q = 0, we have:
H ′′′ (qt) = 3
d2
[
τKt − τNt
]
dq2t
Let us now calculate
d2[τKt −τNt ]
dq2t
with general forms. Remember that we have:
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
= −∆V K + (1− q)d∆V
K
dqt
−
[
∆V N + q
d∆V N
dqt
]
Hence the second-order derivative is:
d2
[
τKt − τNt
]
dq2t
= −2d∆V
K
dqt
+ (1− q)d
2∆V K
dq2t
− 2d∆V
N
dqt
− q d
2∆V N
dq2t
At q = 0, this simplifies to:
d2
[
τKt − τNt
]
dq2t
= −2d∆V
K
dqt
+
d2∆V K
dq2t
− 2d∆V
N
dqt
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We already know that d∆V
K
dqt
= 0 at q = 0:
d2
[
τKt − τNt
]
dq2t
=
d2∆V K
dq2t
− 2d∆V
N
dqt
Hence, given that, at q = 0, we have d∆V
N
dqt
= 0, it follows that:
d2
[
τKt − τNt
]
dq2t
=
d2∆V K
dq2t
From the toolbox, we have, at q = 0:
d2V KK
dq2t
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]

deK∗∗t
dqt
dE(qt)
dqt
1
E∗∗t
+
deK∗∗t
dqt
(
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
)
+
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
− 2deN∗∗tdqt +
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
)
+
deN∗∗t
dqt
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
E∗∗t −eK∗∗t dE(qt)dqt
E∗∗2t
+
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
1
E∗∗t
)

−ψ
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
)2
+
deN∗∗t
dqt
[
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(G′′ (E∗∗t ))
]
d2V KN
dq2t
=
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
[
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− c− ψeN∗∗t ]+ deN∗∗tdqt
[
G′′
(
eN∗∗t
) deN∗∗t
dqt
− ψde
N∗∗
t
dqt
]
=
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
[
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− c− ψeN∗∗t ]+ (deN∗∗tdqt
)2 [
G′′
(
eN∗∗t
)− ψ]
as well as,
deN∗∗t
dqt
=
−
−
((
eK∗∗t +qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
−eN∗∗t
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ

[
1−
(
(1−qt) 1E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]

deK∗∗t
dqt
= −
 eK∗∗tE∗∗t [G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t ]+ ( eK∗∗t qtE∗∗t )(eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)deN∗∗tdqt )G′′ (E∗∗t )
+
(
(1−qt)eN∗∗t −eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
)(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗∗
t
dqt
)
1
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
) 
qt
(
2(1−qt)eN∗∗t
E∗∗2t
) [
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]
+
eK∗∗t qtqt
E∗∗t
[G′′ (E∗∗t )]− ψ
when q = 0, those last two expressions vanish to:
deN∗∗t
dqt
= 0
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deK∗∗t
dqt
=
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
ψ
Hence
deK∗∗t
dqt
=
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
ψ
< 0
Let us now substitute for those two expressions in d
2V KK
dq2t
and d
2V KN
dq2t
. We
have, givendE(qt)dqt = e
K∗∗
t + qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
− eN∗∗t + (1− qt)de
N∗∗
t
dqt
= 0 at q = 0:
d2V KK
dq2t
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
] [
2
deK∗∗t
dqt
+
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
]
− ψ
(
deK∗∗t
dqt
)2
d2V KN
dq2t
=
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
[
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− c− ψeN∗∗t ]
Remind that, from the toolbox, we have:
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
=
2 1E∗∗t
[(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψ
]2
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]
Hence, substituting in d
2V KK
dq2t
and d
2V KN
dq2t
, we have:
d2V KK
dq2t
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
2
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
ψ
+
2 1E∗∗t
[(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψ
]2
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]

−ψ
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t
ψ
2
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Hence
d2V KK
dq2t
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]


2
[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
] [
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]
+ψ
2 1E∗∗t
[(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψ
]2

ψ
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]

−ψ
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t
ψ
2
Hence
d2V KK
dq2t
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]2
1
ψ
 2[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
] − 1

=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]2
1
ψ
 1 +
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]

Moreover,
d2V KN
dq2t
=
d2eN∗∗t
dq2t
[
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− c− ψeN∗∗t ]
Hence
d2V KN
dq2t
=
2 1E∗∗t
[(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψ
]2
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
] [G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψeN∗∗t ]
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Hence
d2V KK
dq2t
− d
2V KN
dq2t
=
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]2
1
ψ
 1 +
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]

−
2 1E∗∗t
[(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
ψ
]2
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
] [G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψeN∗∗t ]
Hence[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]2
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
]
 1ψ +
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ2
− [G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψeN∗∗t ] 2E∗∗t ψ2

Hence[
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
]2
[
1−
(
1
E∗∗t
(
G′(E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
ψ
] 1
E∗∗t ψ2
[[
E∗∗t ψ +
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
− 2 [G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψeN∗∗t ]]]
Hence
the stability condition for q = 0 is:
E∗∗t ψ +
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
− 2 [G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψeN∗∗t ] < 0
Hence
eN∗∗t ψ +
(
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− G(eN∗∗t )
eN∗∗t
)
− 2 [G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψeN∗∗t ] < 0
Let us now replace by eN∗∗t =
(
G(eN∗∗t )
eN∗∗t
−c
)
ψ when q = 0. We have:(
G(eN∗∗t )
eN∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
ψ+
(
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− G(eN∗∗t )
eN∗∗t
)
−2
G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψ
(
G(eN∗∗t )
eN∗∗t
− c
)
ψ
 < 0
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Hence [
−c−G′ (eN∗∗t )+ 2
(
G
(
eN∗∗t
)
eN∗∗t
)]
> 0
Hence, given the interior condition eN∗∗t > 0:[
G
(
eN∗∗t
)
eN∗∗t
−G′ (eN∗∗t )+ G (eN∗∗t )eN∗∗t − c
]
> 0
Hence, 0 is unstable.
9.5.3 Intermediate equilibrium: existence, uniqueness and stability
Regarding the existence, let us consider the space
(
qt, τ
K
t − τNt
)
. We know that,
at q = 1, we have τKt (1)− τNt (1) < 0.
Indeed, we have, at q = 1:
τKt = 0
τNt =
1
κ
 e
N∗∗
t
eK∗t
G
(
eK∗∗t
)− ceN∗∗t − ψ(eN∗∗t )22
−
[
eK∗∗t
eK∗∗t
G
(
eK∗∗t
)− ceK∗∗t − ψ(eK∗t )22 ]

Note also that, at q = 0, we have:
τKt =
1
κ
[
eN∗∗t G
(
eN∗∗t
)
eN∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ
(
eN∗∗t
)2
2
−
[
G
(
eN∗∗t
)− ceN∗∗t − ψ (eN∗∗t )22
]]
= 0
τNt =
0
κ
[
eN∗∗t G (E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceN∗∗t −
ψ
(
eN∗∗t
)2
2
−
[
eK∗∗t G (E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
− ceK∗∗t −
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)2
2
]]
= 0
Hence τKt (0)− τNt (0) = 0.
We also know, from the analysis of stability at q = 0:
d
[
τKt (0)− τNt (0)
]
dqt
= 0
d2
[
τKt (0)− τNt (0)
]
dq2t
> 0
Hence we know that the function τKt (q) − τNt (q) is above the x axis in the(
qt, τ
K
t − τNt
)
in the neighborhood of 0 and below the x axis in the
(
qt, τ
K
t − τNt
)
in the neighborhood of 1. Hence, by continuity, there exists at least one inter-
section of the function τKt (q)− τNt (q) with the x axis. Therefore there exists at
least one intermediate stationary equilibrium.
Regarding uniqueness, a necessary and sufficient for uniqueness of the inter-
mediate stationary equilibrium is that the slope of the function τKt (q)− τNt (q)
is strictly negative at any intermediate stationary equilibrium. We have:
τKt − τNt =
(1− qt)
κ
[
V KK − V KN ]− qt
κ
[
V NN − V NK]
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Hence the derivative:
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
=
−1
κ
[
V KK − V KN + (V NN − V NK)]
+
(1− qt)
κ
[
dV KK
dqt
− dV
KN
dqt
]
−qt
κ
[
dV NN
dqt
− dV
NK
dqt
]
The first term is negative. It captures the cultural substitution effect. The
second and third terms will be decomposed as follows, using the toolbox for
expressions dV
KK
dqt
, dV
KN
dqt
, dV
NN
dqt
and dV
NK
dqt
= dV
KK
dqt
:
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
=
−1
κ
[
V KK − V KN + (V NN − V NK)]
+
(1− qt)
κ

 (eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)deN∗∗tdqt )
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
) 
−
(
deN∗∗t
dqt
[
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− c− ψeN∗∗t ])

−qt
κ

 (eK∗∗t + qt deK∗∗tdqt − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)deN∗∗tdqt )
eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
) 
−
 (eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t + (1− qt)deN∗∗tdqt )
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
) 

Let us now decompose the last two terms into those associated with varia-
tions in the number of animals purchased by each type (for a given q), and into
terms associated with a variation in q for given number of animals:
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
=
−1
κ
[
V KK − V KN + (V NN − V NK)]
+
(1− qt)
κ

(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t
) eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
+
(
(1− qt)de
N∗∗
t
dqt
)
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
−
(
deN∗∗t
dqt
[
G′
(
eN∗∗t
)− c− ψeN∗∗t ])

−qt
κ

− 1E
(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t
) (
(1− qt)de
N∗∗
t
dqt
)(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
+
(
qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
)
eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
− [eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t ]2 (G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E∗∗t )E∗∗t )

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Let us now try to sign each of those terms.
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
=
−1
κ
[
V KK − V KN + (V NN − V NK)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
(1− qt)
κ

(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t
) eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
deN∗∗t
dqt

(1− qt)e
K∗∗
t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
− [G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψeN∗∗t ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+


−qt
κ

− [eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t ]2(G′ (E∗∗t )− G (E∗∗t )E∗∗t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
deN∗∗t
dqt
[
− 1
E∗∗t
(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t
)
(1− qt)
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
deK∗∗t
dqt
[
qt
eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−

The first term of the first bracket is positive: it is the effect of a change in q
on the utility for a Kantian parent to have a Kantian child for a given number
of animals for type N . The second term in the first bracket is the effect, for a
given q, of a change in the number of animals purchased by Nash players on the
utility for a Kantian parent to have a Kantian child.
Let us now interpret the second bracket. The first term in the second bracket
is the impact, for a given number of animals for both types, of a change in qt
on the utility for a Nash parent to have a Nash child. The second term in
the second bracket is the impact, for a given qt, of a change in the number of
animals purchased by Nash players on the utility for a Nash parent to have a
Nash child. The third term in the second brackets is the impact, for a given
qt, of a change in the number of animals purchased by Impure Kantians on the
utility for a Nash parent to have a Nash child.
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Having carried out this decomposition, let us go further in the calculations:
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
=
−1
κ
[
eN∗∗t G (E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
−G (eN∗∗t )]
+
1
κ
((
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t
) eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
+
deN∗∗t
dqt
(1− qt)
κ

− [G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψeN∗∗t ]
+
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)
−qt e
N∗∗
t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)

−qt
κ
[(
eK∗∗t + qt
deK∗∗t
dqt
− eN∗∗t
)
eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)]
Hence:
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
=
−1
κ
[
eN∗∗t G (E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
−G (eN∗∗t )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
1
κ
((
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t
) eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
deN∗∗t
dqt
(1− qt)
κ
( − [G′ (eN∗∗t )− c− ψeN∗∗t ]
+
(
G′ (E∗∗t )− G(E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
)(
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
− qt e
N∗∗
t
E∗∗t
) )
−qt
κ
[(
eK∗∗t − eN∗∗t
) eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
−de
K∗∗
t
dqt
eN∗∗t
E∗∗t
qt
κ
qt
(
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G (E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
)
Remind that the FOC for Impure Kantians is:(
E∗∗t − eK∗∗t qt
(E∗∗t )
2 G (E
∗∗
t ) +
eK∗∗t
E∗∗t
G′ (E∗∗t ) qt − c
)
= ψeK∗∗t
eK∗∗t qt
E∗∗t
[
G′ (E∗∗t )−
G(E∗∗t )
E∗∗t
]
− c+ G (E
∗∗
t )
E∗∗t
= ψeK∗∗t
Hence, given that we are here at an intermediate stationary equilibrium, the
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condition is:
d
[
τKt − τNt
]
dqt
=
−1
κ
[
V KK − V KN + (V NN − V NK)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
(1− q∗∗)
κ

(
eK∗∗ − eN∗∗) eK∗∗
E∗∗
(
G′ (E∗∗)− G (E
∗∗)
E∗∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+de
N∗∗
dq∗∗
(
eK∗∗
E∗∗ G
′ (E∗∗) + G(E
∗∗)
E∗∗
(
1− eK∗∗E∗∗
)
− [G′ (eN∗∗)− ψ (eN∗∗ − eK∗∗)]
)

−q
∗∗
κ

− [eK∗∗ − eN∗∗]2(G′ (E∗∗)− G (E∗∗)
E∗∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+de
N∗∗
dq∗∗ −
1
E∗∗
(
eK∗∗ − eN∗∗) (1− q∗∗)(G′ (E∗∗)− G (E∗∗)
E∗∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+de
K∗∗
dq∗∗ q
∗∗ e
N∗∗
E∗∗
(
G′ (E∗∗)− G (E
∗∗)
E∗∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−

9.6 Proof of Proposition 11
Existence and uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium with quotas. A station-
ary equilibrium under quota qQ, if it exists, satisfies
(1− qQ) (V KK − V KN)− qQ (V NN − V NK) = 0,
with
V KK = A
(
eK∗
)1/2 − 2ψ (eK∗)3/2
3
,
V KN = A (e¯)
1/2 − 2ψ (e¯)
3/2
3
,
V NK = eK∗A
(
qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−1/2 − 2ψ (eK∗)3/2
3
,
V NN = e¯A
(
qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−1/2 − 2ψ (e¯)3/2
3
.
Proof for existence follows from proof of Proposition 6 and is due to the
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cultural substitution effect. The uniqueness condition writes as
− (V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK)
+ (1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
dq
− qQ d(V
NN − V NK)
dq
< 0,
⇔− (V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK)− qQ d(V NN − V NK)
dq
< 0,
⇔− (V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK)
− qQ
(
1
2
(e¯− eK∗)2A (qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−3/2) < 0
⇔−AeK∗
[
(eK∗)−
1
2 − (qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 12 ]
−Ae¯
[(
qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 12 − (e¯)− 12 ]
− qQ
(
1
2
(e¯− eK∗)2A (qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)e¯))−3/2 < 0
which is true since eK∗ < qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)e¯ < e¯.
We shall prove that for some value of e¯ ∈ [eK∗, eN∗], the introduction of the
quota increases the total number of animal, i.e. has a negative impact on global
provision of public good. To do so, we proceed in two steps. In a first step we
show that the introduction of a quota may reduce the number of Pure Kantians
in the economy, i.e qQ(eN∗) ≡ qLF > qQ(e¯), for some e¯ ∈ [eK∗, eN∗[.
We have
dqQ
de¯
= − (1− q
Q)d(V
KK−V KN )
de¯ − qQ d(V
NN−V NK)
de¯
− (V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK)− qQ d(V NN−V NK)dq
.
The denominator is negative so that dq
Q
de¯ is of the sign of (1−qQ)d(V
KK−V KN )
de¯ −
qQ d(V
NN−V NK)
de¯ . We have
dV KK
de¯
= 0,
dV KN
de¯
=
1
2
(e¯)
− 12 − ψ (e¯)1/2 ,
dV NK
de¯
=
−1
2
(1− q)eK∗A (qeK∗ + (1− q)e¯)−3/2 ,
dV NN
de¯
= A
(
qeK∗ + (1− q)e¯)−1/2 + e¯(1− q)−1
2
A
(
eK∗ + (1− q)e¯)−3/2 − ψ (e¯)1/2 .
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In particular,
dV KN
de¯
|e¯=eN∗ =
1
2
(eN∗)
− 12 − ψ (eN∗)1/2 < 0,
d(V NN − V NK)
de¯
|e¯=eN∗ =
−1
2
(1− q)(eN∗ − eK∗)A (qeK∗ + (1− q)eN∗)−3/2 < 0,
using the FOC for Nash and Pure Kantians and given that eK∗ < qeK∗ +
(1 − q)eN∗ < eN∗. We deduce that dqQde¯ |e¯=eN∗ > 0. Since we also have
qQ(eN∗) = qLF , we deduce that there exists some value e¯ ∈ [eK∗, eN∗[ such
that qQ(e¯) < qLF .
In a second step we interest in the sign of ∆E ≡ EQ − ELF .
Let us now compare the total number of animals at the laissez-faire and
under the quota.
We have:
ELF = qLF eK∗ + (1− qLF )eN∗t
EQ = qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)e¯
We define ∆E ≡ ELF − EQ.,
∆E = qLF eK∗ + (1− qLF )eN∗t −
[
qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)e¯]
Hence
∆E = eK∗
(
qLF − qQ)+ (eN∗t − e¯)− (qLF eN∗t − qQe¯)
Hence
∆E = eK∗
(
qLF − qQ)+ (eN∗t − e¯)− (qLF eN∗t − qQe¯− qLF e¯+ qLF e¯)
Hence
∆E = eK∗
(
qLF − qQ)+ (eN∗t − e¯)− (qLF (eN∗t − e¯)+ e¯(qLF − qQ))
Let us also define:
∆q ≡ qLF − qQ > 0
∆e ≡ eN∗t − e¯ > 0
and re-express ∆E as
∆E = eK∗∆q + ∆e− (qLF∆e+ e¯∆q)
Hence,
∆E = −(e¯− eK∗)∆q + (1− qLF )∆e
When the quota raises the number of sheep, we have ∆E < 0. ∆E is negative
if and only if
−(e¯− eK∗)∆q + (1− qLF )∆e < 0
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which is equivalent to
(1− qLF )∆e < (e¯− eK∗)∆q
that is
(1− qLF )/(e¯− eK∗) < ∆q/∆e
This condition certainly does not hold for any value of e¯ (in particular it is
violated at e¯ = eK∗). Let us study this condition in a neighborhood of eN∗t . To
do so, take the limit when e¯ tends to eN∗t for both sides of the inequality. For
the left-hand side, we have
lim
e¯→eN∗t
(1− qLF )/(e¯− eK∗) = (1− qLF )/(eN∗t − eK∗)
For the right-hand side, note that
lim
e¯→eN∗t
∆q/∆e =
dq
de¯ e¯=eN∗t
since qLF and qQ are values of the function q(e¯) (i.e. the values of the stationary
equilibrium for any e¯) respectively taken at eNt and e¯.
Therefore in a neighborhood of eN∗t , the condition becomes:
dqQ
de¯
|eN∗ >
(1− qQ)
eN∗ − eK∗ ,
⇔ −(1− q
Q)dV
KN
de¯ |eN∗ − qQ d(V
NN−V NK)
de¯ |eN∗
(V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK) + qQ d(V NN−V NK)dq
|eN∗ >
(1− qQ)
eN∗ − eK∗ ,
⇔− (1− qQ)dV
KN
de¯
|eN∗ − qQ
d(V NN − V NK)
de¯
|eN∗
>
(1− qQ)
eN∗ − eK∗
((
V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK)+ qQ d(V NN − V NK)
dq
|eN∗
)
.
We have
d
(
V NN − V NK)
dq
|e¯=eN∗ =
1
2
(
eN∗ − eK∗)2A (qeK∗ + (1− q)eN∗)−3/2
and
d
(
V KK − V KN)
de¯
|e¯=eN∗ = AeK∗
−1
2
(
qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗)−3/2 (1− qQ),
so that the condition for ∆E < 0 becomes
−(1− qQ)dV
KN
de¯
|eN∗ >
(1− qQ)
eN∗ − eK∗
(
V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK) .
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Let simplify and substitute for V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK as well as for
dV KN
de¯ |eN∗ ,
−1
2
A(eN∗)−1/2+ψ(eN∗)1/2 >
A
(
eK∗
)1/2 −A (eN∗)1/2
eN∗ − eK∗ +A
(
qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗)−1/2 .
Remind that due to the FOC for Nash players, we have
A
(
qQeK∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗)−1/2 = ψ(eN∗)1/2,
so that the above condition is equivalent to
− 1
2
A(eN∗)−1/2 + ψ(eN∗)1/2 >
A
(
eK∗
)1/2 −A (eN∗)1/2
eN∗ − eK∗ + ψ(e
N∗)1/2
⇔− 1
2
A(eN∗)−1/2 >
A
(
eK∗
)1/2 −A (eN∗)1/2
eN∗ − eK∗
⇔1
2
A(eN∗)−1/2 <
A
(
eN∗
)1/2 −A (eK∗)1/2
eN∗ − eK∗ ,
which is true by the concavity of the function f(x) = Ax
1
2 (and since eN∗ >
eK∗).
9.7 Proof of Proposition 12
Existence and uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium with quotas. A station-
ary equilibrium under quota qQ, if it exists, satisfies
(1− qQ) (V KK − V KN)− qQ (V NN − V NK) = 0,
with
V KK = eK∗∗A
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−1/2 − 2ψ (eK∗∗)3/2
3
,
V KN = A (e¯)
1/2 − 2ψ (e¯)
3/2
3
,
V NK = V KK = eK∗∗A
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−1/2 − 2ψ (eK∗∗)3/2
3
,
V NN = e¯A
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−1/2 − 2ψ (e¯)3/2
3
.
Proof for existence follows from proof of Proposition. Uniqueness requires
− (V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK)
+ (1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
dq
− qQ d(V
NN − V NK)
dq
+
deK∗∗
dq
(
(1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
deK∗∗
− qQ d(V
NN − V NK)
deK∗∗
)
≡ −B < 0.
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which is assumed in what follows.
Let us first express the derivative. We have
dqQ
de¯
=
[
(1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
de¯
− qQ d(V
NN − V NK)
de¯
+
deK∗∗
de¯
(
(1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
deK∗∗
− qQ d(V
NN − V NK)
deK∗∗
)]
/[(
V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK)− (1− qQ)d(V KK − V KN )
dq
+ qQ
d(V NN − V NK)
dq
−de
K∗∗
dq
(
(1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
deK∗∗
− qQ d(V
NN − V NK)
deK∗∗
)]
.
Find out the sign of this derivative is not so easy. Therefore, we directly show
that, for some parameters combination we have ∆E ≡ EQ − ELF < 0 since it
implies dq
Q
de¯ > 0. Using similar arguments than the case of Pure Kantians, we
find that the condition for ∆E ≡ EQ − ELF < 0 when e¯ close to eN∗∗ is
dqQ
de¯
|eN∗∗ >
(1− qQ)
eN∗∗ − eK∗ + q
Q de
K∗∗
de¯
1
eN∗∗ − eK∗
⇔
[
(1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
de¯
|eN∗∗ − qQ
d(V NN − V NK)
de¯
|eN∗∗
+
deK∗∗
de¯
(
(1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
deK∗∗
|eN∗∗ − qQ
d(V NN − V NK)
deK∗∗
|eN∗∗
)]
>
(1− qQ)
eN∗∗ − eK∗
[
V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK
− (1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
dq
|eN∗∗ + qQ
d(V NN − V NK)
dq
|eN∗∗
−de
K∗∗
dq
(
(1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
deK∗∗
|eN∗∗ − qQ
d(V NN − V NK)
deK∗∗
|eN∗∗
)]
+ qQ
deK∗∗
de¯
1
eN∗∗ − eK∗ .
Note that dV
KK
deK∗∗ = 0 =
dV NK
deK∗∗ and
dV KN
deK∗∗ = 0 so that the above condition
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re-writes as[
(1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
de¯
|eN∗∗ − qQ
d(V NN − V NK)
de¯
|eN∗∗
+
deK∗∗
de¯
(
−qQ dV
NN
deK∗∗
|eN∗∗
)]
>
(1− qQ)
eN∗∗ − eK∗
[
V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK
− (1− qQ)d(V
KK − V KN )
dq
|eN∗∗ + qQ
d(V NN − V NK)
dq
|eN∗∗
−de
K∗∗
dq
(
−qQ dV
NN
deK∗∗
|eN∗∗
)]
+ qQ
deK∗∗
de¯
1
eN∗∗ − eK∗B.
When studying introduction of a quota in the case of Pure Kantians, we already
performed d(V
NN−V NK)
de¯ |eN∗∗ and d(V
NN−V NK)
dq |eN∗∗ and found that
d(V NN − V NK)
de¯
|eN∗∗ = −
(1− qQ)
eN∗∗ − eK∗
d(V NN − V NK)
dq
|eN∗∗ .
Computing each of the derivatives involved in the above condition one can check
that
d(V KK − V KN )
de¯
|eN∗∗ = −
(1− qQ)
eN∗∗ − eK∗
d(V KK − V KN )
dq
|eN∗∗ ,
also,
− de
K∗∗
dq
=
deK∗∗
de¯
eN∗∗ − eK∗
(1− qQ) +
1
2Ae
K∗∗ (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2[
qQA
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 32 − (3/4)(qQ)2eK∗∗A (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 52
+(1/2)Ψ(eK∗∗)−
1
2
]
and,
dV NN
deK∗∗
|eN∗∗ = −
1
2
qQe¯A
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−3/2
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Therefore, the condition above re-writes as,
− (1− qQ)dV
KN
de¯
|eN∗∗ >
(1− qQ)
eN∗∗ − eK∗
[
V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK+
(1/4)(qQ)2A2eK∗∗eN∗∗
[(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−3/2]2[
qQA
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 32 − (3/4)(qQ)2eK∗∗A (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 52
+(1/2)Ψ(eK∗∗)−
1
2
]

+ qQ
deK∗∗
de¯
1
eN∗∗ − eK∗B.
Let substitute for V KK − V KN + V NN − V NK as well as for dV KNde¯ |eN∗∗ and
rearrange the terms, we find
− 1
2
A(eN∗∗)−1/2 + ψ(eN∗∗)1/2 >
AeK∗
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−1/2 −A (eN∗∗)1/2
eN∗∗ − eK∗
+A
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−1/2
+
(1/4) 1
eN∗∗−eK∗ (q
Q)2A2eK∗∗eN∗∗
[(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−3/2]2
qQA (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 32 − (3/4)(qQ)2eK∗∗A (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 52 + (1/2)Ψ(eK∗∗)− 12
+
qQ
(1− qQ)
deK∗∗
de¯
1
eN∗∗ − eK∗B.
Since, AeK∗
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−1/2 < AeK∗ (eK∗)−1/2 = A (eK∗)1/2, a suf-
ficient condition is
− 1
2
A(eN∗∗)−1/2 + ψ(eN∗∗)1/2 >
A
(
eK∗
)1/2 −A (eN∗∗)1/2
eN∗∗ − eK∗
+A
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−1/2
+
(1/4)(qQ)2A2eK∗∗eN∗∗
[(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)−3/2]2 1
eN∗∗−eK∗
qQA (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 32 − (3/4)(qQ)2eK∗∗A (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)e¯)− 52 + (1/2)Ψ(eK∗∗)− 12
+
qQ
(1− qQ)
deK∗∗
de¯
1
eN∗∗ − eK∗B.
Using similar reasoning than for the case of Pure Kantians, we have
−1
2
A(eN∗∗)−1/2+ψ(eN∗∗)1/2 >
A
(
eK∗
)1/2 −A (eN∗∗)1/2
eN∗∗ − eK∗ +A
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−1/2 ,
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so that a sufficient condition for the inequality to hold is
(1/4)(qQ)2A2eK∗∗eN∗∗
[(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2]2 1
eN∗−eK∗[
qQA
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)− 32 − (3/4)(qQ)2eK∗∗A (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)− 52
+(1/2)Ψ(eK∗∗)−
1
2
]
+
qQ
(1− qQ)
deK∗∗
de¯
1
eN∗∗ − eK∗B < 0.
Let us substitute for de
K∗∗
de¯ ,
(1/4)(qQ)2A2eK∗∗eN∗∗
[(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2]2 1
eN∗∗−eK∗[
qQA
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)− 32 − (3/4)(qQ)2eK∗∗A (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)− 52
+(1/2)Ψ(eK∗∗)−
1
2
]
1
2q
QA
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)− 32 (−1 + 32qQ eK∗∗qQeK∗∗+(1−qQ)eN∗∗) 1eN∗∗−eK∗[
qQA
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)− 32 − (3/4)(qQ)2eK∗∗A (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)− 52
+(1/2)Ψ(eK∗∗)−
1
2
]B
< 0,
⇔(1/2)(qQ)AeK∗∗eN∗∗ (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2 +B(−1 + 3
2
qQ
eK∗∗
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗
)
< 0.
We consider two cases.
(i) Suppose that B > 12Aq
Q(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗)2 (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2. A
sufficient condition is now,
(1/2)(qQ)AeK∗∗eN∗∗
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2
+
[
1
2Aq
Q(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗)2 (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2(
−1 + 32qQ e
K∗∗
qQeK∗∗+(1−qQ)eN∗∗
) ]
< 0
Since qQ < 12 and
eK∗∗
qQeK∗∗+(1−qQ)eN∗∗ < 1, a sufficient condition is
−1
4
(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗)2 − eK∗∗eN∗∗ < 0.
This is a polynomial function of eN∗∗ which is convex and positive whenever
eN∗∗ > 6eK∗∗. Hence, the condition holds when parameters are such that
eN∗∗ > 6eK∗∗.
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(ii) Suppose that B < 12Aq
Q(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗)2 (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2. Re-
mind that the condition for ∆E < 0 is[
(1− qQ)d(V KK−V KN )de¯ |eN∗∗ − qQ d(V
NN−V NK)
de¯ |eN∗∗
+de
K∗∗
de¯
(
(1− qQ)d(V KK−V KN )
deK∗∗ |eN∗∗ − qQ d(V
NN−V NK)
deK∗∗ |eN∗∗
) ]
>
B
[
(1− qQ)
eN∗∗ − eK∗ + q
Q de
K∗∗
de¯
1
eN∗∗ − eK∗
]
A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is then[
(1− qQ)d(V KK−V KN )de¯ |eN∗∗ − qQ d(V
NN−V NK)
de¯ |eN∗∗
+de
K∗∗
de¯
(
(1− qQ)d(V KK−V KN )
deK∗∗ |eN∗∗ − qQ d(V
NN−V NK)
deK∗∗ |eN∗∗
) ]
>[
1
2Aq
Q(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗)2 (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2
(1−qQ)
eN∗∗−eK∗ + q
Q deK∗∗
de¯
1
eN∗∗−eK∗
]
That is,[
(1− qQ)d(V KK−V KN )de¯ |eN∗∗ − qQ d(V
NN−V NK)
de¯ |eN∗∗
+de
K∗∗
de¯
(
(1− qQ)d(V KK−V KN )
deK∗∗ |eN∗∗ − qQ d(V
NN−V NK)
deK∗∗ |eN∗∗
) ]
>
1
2
AqQ(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗) (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2 [1− qQ + qQ deK∗∗
de¯
]
Let substitute for d(V
KK−V KN )
de¯ |eN∗∗ , d(V
NN−V NK)
de¯ |eN∗∗ , d(V
KK−V KN )
deK∗∗ |eN∗∗ ,
and rearrange the terms,
(1− qQ)

− 12A(1− qQ)eK∗∗
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2
−
(
1
2A(e
N∗∗)−
1
2 −Ψ(eN∗∗) 12
)
+ 12q
Q(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗)A (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2

+ (qQ)2
1
2
AeN∗∗
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2 deK∗∗
de¯
>
1
2
AqQ(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗) (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2 [1− qQ + qQ deK∗∗
de¯
]
.
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This is equivalent to
(1− qQ)

− 12A(1− qQ)eK∗∗
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2
−
(
1
2A(e
N∗∗)−
1
2 −Ψ(eN∗∗) 12
)
+ 12q
Q(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗)A (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2
− 12AqQ(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗)
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2

>
qQ
deK∗∗
de¯
[
1
2Aq
Q(eN∗∗ − eK∗∗) (qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2
−qQ 12AeN∗∗
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2
]
or,
(1− qQ)

− 12AeK∗∗
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2
−
(
1
2A(e
N∗∗)−
1
2 −Ψ(eN∗∗) 12
)
+ 12Aq
Q
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2 eK∗∗

>
qQ
deK∗∗
de¯
[
1
2
AqQ
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2 (−eK∗∗)]
We can show that
−1
2
AeK∗∗
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2 − (1
2
A(eN∗∗)−
1
2 −Ψ(eN∗∗) 12
)
> 0
and a sufficient condition is
(1− qQ)
[
1
2
AqQ
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2 eK∗∗]
>
qQ
deK∗∗
de¯
[
1
2
AqQ
(
qQeK∗∗ + (1− qQ)eN∗∗)−3/2 (−eK∗∗)]
which is equivalent to
qQ
deK∗∗
de¯
+ (1− qQ) > 0,
which condition always holds.
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9.8 Proof of Proposition 13
When α = 1/2, the four equations become:
A
(
qte
K∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗t
)−1/2 − ψ (eN∗t )1/2 = 0
αAe
K∗−1/2
t − ψ
(
eK∗t
)1/2
= 0 ⇐⇒ eK∗t =
A
2ψ
A
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−1/2 − ψ (eN∗∗t )1/2 = 0[
A
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−1/2
+−12 qte
K∗∗
t A
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−3/2
]
− ψ (eK∗∗t )1/2 = 0
We have:
A
(
qte
K∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗t
)−1/2 − ψ (eN∗t )1/2 = 0
Hence
(1− qt)
(
eN∗t
)2
+ qte
K∗
t e
N∗
t −
A2
ψ2
= 0
Hence:
∆ =
(
qte
K∗
t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A
2
ψ2
Hence:
eN∗t =
−qteK∗t + 2
√(
qteK∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A2ψ2
2(1− qt)
We also have:
eN∗∗t =
−qteK∗∗t + 2
√(
qteK∗∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A2ψ2
2(1− qt)
Hence, substituting for eK∗t in e
N∗
t , we obtain:
eN∗t =
A
ψ
− qt2 + 2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
2(1− qt)
Let us now differentiate eN∗∗t with respect to e
K∗∗
t . We obtain:
∂eN∗∗t
∂eK∗∗t
=
−qt + 12
[(
qte
K∗∗
t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A2ψ2
]−1/2
2
(
qte
K∗∗
t
)
qt
2(1− qt)
= qt
−1 +
[(
qte
K∗∗
t
)2
+ (1− qt) 4A2ψ2
]−1/2
qte
K∗∗
t
2(1− qt)
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That expression is negative iff:[(
qte
K∗∗
t
)2
+ (1− qt)4A
2
ψ2
]−1/2
qte
K∗∗
t < 1
(
qte
K∗∗
t
)−1/2(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)
4A2
ψ2qteK∗∗t
)−1/2
qte
K∗∗
t < 1[
qte
K∗∗
t
qteK∗∗t + (1− qt) 4A2ψ2qteK∗∗t
]1/2
< 1
which is true.
Let us now take the FOC for optimal eK∗∗t and differentiate with respect to
eK∗∗t . We obtain:
A
−1
2
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−3/2(
qt + (1− qt)∂e
N∗∗
t
∂eK∗∗t
)
+
−1
2
qtA
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−3/2
+
−1
2
qte
K∗∗
t A
−3
2
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−5/2(
qt + (1− qt)∂e
N∗∗
t
∂eK∗∗t
)
− 1
2
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)−1/2
Let us first compute
(
qt + (1− qt)∂e
N∗∗
t
∂eK∗∗t
)
:
qt + (1− qt)qt
−1 +
[(
qte
K∗∗
t
)2
+ (1− qt) 4A2ψ2
]−1/2
qte
K∗∗
t
2(1− qt)
= qt
1
2
1 + qteK∗∗t[(
qteK∗∗t
)2
+ (1− qt) 4A2ψ2
]1/2
 > 0
Let factorize the expression:
A
−1
2
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−3/2(
qt + (1− qt)∂e
N∗∗
t
∂eK∗∗t
)[
1− 3
2
qte
K∗∗
t(
qteK∗∗t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)]
+
−1
2
qtA
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−3/2 − 1
2
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)−1/2
< 0
The rationale goes as follows. Suppose that 1 − 32 qte
K∗∗
t
(qteK∗∗t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t )
> 0.
Then, given qt + (1 − qt)∂e
N∗∗
t
∂eK∗∗t
> 0, the three terms of the sum are negative.
Suppose now that 1 − 32 qte
K∗∗
t
(qteK∗∗t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t )
< 0. Let us rewrite the expression
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as:
A
−1
2
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−3/2
qt
[
1− 3
2
qte
K∗∗
t(
qteK∗∗t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)]
+
−1
2
qtA
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−3/2 − 1
2
ψ
(
eK∗∗t
)−1/2
+A
−1
2
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−3/2
(1− qt)∂e
N∗∗
t
∂eK∗∗t
[
1− 3
2
qte
K∗∗
t(
qteK∗∗t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)]
We know from the SOC that the sum of the first three terms is negative. But
as
∂eN∗∗t
∂eK∗∗t
< 0 and 1− 32 qte
K∗∗
t
(qteK∗∗t +(1−qt)eN∗∗t )
< 0, the last term is also negative.
Let us define:
z
(
eK∗∗t
)
= A
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−1/2
+
−1
2
qte
K∗∗
t A
(
qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t
)−3/2−ψ (eK∗∗t )1/2
where eN∗∗t =
−qteK∗∗t + 2
√
(qteK∗∗t )
2
+4(1−qt)A2ψ2
2(1−qt) .
We know that
z
(
eK∗∗t
)
= 0
z′
(
eK∗∗t
)
< 0
We want to compare eK∗t and e
K∗∗
t . For that purpose, given the two previous
equations, we have that if z
(
eK∗t
)
> 0 then eK∗t < e
K∗∗
t .
Let us now substitute for eK∗t in that expression. We obtain:
z
(
eK∗t
)
= A
(
qte
K∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗t
)−1/2
+
−1
2
qte
K∗
t A
(
qte
K∗
t + (1− qt)eN∗t
)−3/2 − ψ (eK∗t )1/2
= A
qt A
2ψ
+ (1− qt)A
ψ
− qt2 + 2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
2(1− qt)
−1/2
+
−1
2
qt
A
2ψ
A
qt A
2ψ
+ (1− qt)A
ψ
− qt2 + 2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
2(1− qt)
−3/2 − ψ( A
2ψ
)1/2
Hence we obtain:
A
(
A
2ψ
)−1/2(
qt
2 +
2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
)−1/2
+−12 qtA
(
A
2ψ
)−1/2(
qt
2 +
2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
)−3/2
− ψ
(
A
2ψ
)1/2

Let us now check the sign of that expression. It is positive iff:
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
A
(
A
2ψ
)−1/2(
qt
2 +
2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
)−1/2
+−12 qtA
(
A
2ψ
)−1/2(
qt
2 +
2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
)−3/2
− ψ
(
A
2ψ
)1/2
 > 0
Let us multiply the whole expression by
(
A
2ψ
)1/2
. Then:(
qt
2
+
2
√(qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
)−1/2 1− 12qt
1
2qt +
2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
− 1
2
> 0
Hence
2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)(
qt
2 +
2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
)3/2 > 12
We know that the LHS equals 12√2 >
1
2 when qt = 0 and that the LHS
equals 1/2 when qt = 1. Plotting the LHS for qt ∈ [0, 1] shows that the above
inequality is always satisfied.
Thus we have z
(
eK∗t
)
> 0 implying eK∗t < e
K∗∗
t .
Note that, since Nash players have, for a given qt, the same reaction func-
tions, given by:
eN∗t =
−qteK∗t + 2
√(
qteK∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A2ψ2
2(1− qt)
eN∗∗t =
−qteK∗∗t + 2
√(
qteK∗∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A2ψ2
2(1− qt)
and since the reaction functions for Nash players are decreasing in respec-
tively eK∗t and e
K∗∗
t , the inequality e
K∗
t < e
K∗∗
t implies e
N∗
t > e
N∗∗
t .
Let us now check whether, under our parametrization, we have E∗t = qte
K∗
t +
(1− qt)eN∗t ≷ E∗∗t = qteK∗∗t + (1− qt)eN∗∗t .
We have
E∗t = qt
A
2ψ
+ (1− qt)A
ψ
− qt2 + 2
√(
qt
2
)2
+ 4(1− qt)
2(1− qt)
E∗t = qte
K∗
t + (1− qt)
−qteK∗t + 2
√(
qteK∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A2ψ2
2(1− qt)
We have
E∗∗t = qte
K∗∗
t + (1− qt)
−qteK∗∗t + 2
√(
qteK∗∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A2ψ2
2(1− qt)
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Let us simplify further:
E∗t =
1
2
(
qte
K∗
t +
2
√(
qteK∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A
2
ψ2
)
E∗∗t =
1
2
(
qte
K∗∗
t +
2
√(
qteK∗∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A
2
ψ2
)
We have:
E∗t < E
∗∗
t ⇐⇒ 2
√(
qteK∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A
2
ψ2
− 2
√(
qteK∗∗t
)2
+ 4(1− qt)A
2
ψ2
< qt
(
eK∗∗t − eK∗t
)
Obviously, when qt = 0 or qt = 1, the LHS is equal to the RHS.
The function 2
√
(qtx)
2
+ 4(1− qt)A2ψ2 being increasing in x, and eK∗t < eK∗∗t ,
we have that the LHS is negative. But the RHS is always positive, since, eK∗∗t >
eK∗t . Hence the inequality is always satisfied.
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